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ARTICLES 
ALIEN LANGUAGE:  IMMIGRATION 
METAPHORS AND THE JURISPRUDENCE OF 
OTHERNESS 
Keith Cunningham-Parmeter*
 
 
Metaphors tell the story of immigration law.  Throughout its immigration 
jurisprudence, the U.S. Supreme Court has employed rich metaphoric 
language to describe immigrants attacking nations and aliens flooding 
communities.  This Article applies research in cognitive linguistics to 
critically evaluate the metaphoric construction of immigrants in the law. 
Three conceptual metaphors dominate legal texts:  IMMIGRANTS ARE 
ALIENS, IMMIGRATION IS A FLOOD, and IMMIGRATION IS AN INVASION.  In 
order to gauge the prevalence of these metaphors, the Article engages in a 
textual analysis of modern Supreme Court opinions and presents original 
empirical data on the incidence of alienage terminology in federal court 
decisions.  The Article explains how immigration metaphors influence not 
only judicial outcomes, but also social discourse and the broader debate 
over immigration reform.  As such, the theoretical study of language has 
very practical consequences for the people defined by immigration 
metaphors. 
The Article concludes by proposing an oppositional metaphoric 
framework based on the concepts of migration and economic sanctuary.  
These metaphors describe immigration in terms of movement, work, and 
community, in contrast to existing legal metaphors that describe 
immigration in terms of danger, attack, and criminality.  Thus, while 
today’s immigration metaphors signify a loss of economic security and 
cultural hegemony, the proposed terms emphasize immigrants’ economic 
contributions and potential for social belonging.  This process of evaluation 
and substitution diminishes the power of existing metaphors to conflate and 
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essentialize, while creating space in the legal imagination for new frames to 
emerge. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“An Oriental invasion . . . a menace to our civilization . . . .” 
-Justice Stephen J. Field, 18891
 
 
“‘[T]his silent invasion of illegal aliens from Mexico . . . .’” 
-Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, 19752
 
 
“[T]he northbound tide of illegal entrants . . . .” 
-Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, 20003
 
 1. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 595 (1889). 
 
 2. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 904 (1975) (Burger, J., concurring) (quoting 
United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 402–08 (S.D. Cal. 1973)). 
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William Rehnquist referred to Mexican children as “wetbacks.”4  No one 
disputes that the future Chief Justice of the Supreme Court used the ethnic 
slur in front of his colleagues in 1981.5  When a shocked Justice Thurgood 
Marshall objected, Justice Rehnquist defended himself arguing that 
“wetback” still carried “currency in his part of the country.”6
Justice Rehnquist would go on to author some of the most important 
immigration decisions of the late twentieth century.  In those opinions, he 
did not refer to immigrants as “wetbacks.”  Rather he employed a rich array 
of metaphors to describe a nation at risk.  He wrote of “an avalanche of 
claims” coming from unauthorized immigrants.
 
7  He described the fight 
against illegal immigration as a form of “‘national self protection.’”8  He 
argued that federal law must “combat[] the employment of illegal aliens.”9  
The larger cognitive frame structuring these statements might be described 
as IMMIGRATION IS A LOSING BATTLE.10
A growing body of research in cognitive linguistics demonstrates that 
human beings view the world in metaphoric terms.
  Illegal aliens are entering the 
country like an avalanche—dangerous, monolithic, overpowering, and 
unstoppable.  Law enforcement officers are engaged in combat for national 
self-protection.  In this metaphoric war, Supreme Court Justices become 
soldiers who must protect citizens against the impending alien offensive. 
11
 
 3. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 38 (2000). 
  In attempting to 
 4. Justice William J. Brennan, Conference Notes, Plyler v. Doe (Nos. 80-1538, 80-
1934) (Dec. 8, 1981) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, William J. 
Brennan Papers, Part I:  Box 572).  A “wetback” is a racist term first used in 1929 to refer to 
Mexican people crossing the Rio Grande River. 20 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 173 
(2d ed. 1989); see also Rocha Virgil v. City of Las Cruces, 119 F.3d 871, 871–74 (10th Cir. 
1997) (Lucero, J., dissenting) (comparing the term to other racial epithets). 
 5. THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940–1985):  THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS 
BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 760–63 (Del Dickson ed., 2001). 
 6. William J. Brennan, Conference Histories IX, Plyler v. Doe (Nos. 80-1538, 80-1934) 
(on file with author); see also Jim Newton, The Brennan Memos, SLATE (Jan. 9–11, 2007), 
available at http://www.slate.com/id/2156940/entry/2156943/. 
 7. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 504 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 8. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 887 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., 
concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925)). 
 9. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002) (emphasis 
added). 
 10. Throughout this Article, I employ the linguistic convention of using small capital 
letters to refer to conceptual metaphors and italicized letters to refer to metaphoric linguistic 
expressions. See infra Part I.A and accompanying text (discussing the distinction between 
conceptual metaphors and metaphoric linguistic expressions); see also Bruce Kochis & 
Diane Gillespie, Conceptual Metaphors as Interpretive Tools in Qualitative Research:  A 
Re-Examination of College Students’ Diversity Discussions, 11 QUALITATIVE REP. 566, 567 
n.1 (2006) (using the convention). 
 11. See generally MARK JOHNSON, THE BODY IN THE MIND:  THE BODILY BASIS OF 
MEANING, IMAGINATION, AND REASON (1987); GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND 
DANGEROUS THINGS:  WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND (1987); GEORGE LAKOFF 
& MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980). 
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comprehend new ideas, people borrow from familiar concepts.12  The 
metaphors floating in our minds determine our linguistic choices, which in 
turn affect social discourse and ultimately social action.  Thus, how we 
think metaphorically affects how we talk about problems and the solutions 
we formulate in response to those problems.13  This becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy:  the more we repeat, circulate, and repackage certain 
metaphors, the more our conceptual domains become tied to a limited set of 
associations.14
Justice Rehnquist’s description of immigrants illustrates this point.  By 
using and defending the word “wetback” in front of his colleagues, Justice 
Rehnquist revealed a particular perspective on immigration.  As his defense 
of the term suggests, he viewed “wetback” as a neutral word—simply a way 
to refer to Mexican immigrants that was linguistically and culturally 
appropriate in “his part of the country.”
   
15  His conceptual frame of 
immigrants, then, created a version of reality that highlighted certain 
features of immigrants, while obscuring others.16  Namely, the image of 
immigrants as “wetbacks” focuses on immigration-related characteristics 
such as illegality, ethnicity, and invasion, while concealing other 
characteristics such as personhood, diversity, and belonging.  Through this 
process of metaphoric framing, inferences and understandings arise that 
severely restrict the universe of possible judicial outcomes.17
 The external face of the law denies the importance of language, yet 
metaphor’s prevalence in legal texts indicates otherwise.
 
18  Supreme Court 
opinions that appear to express objective legal principles rely heavily on 
nonliteral language to reach their conclusions.19  For example, the Supreme 
Court frequently refers to corporations as people.20  The wall of 
separation21
 
 12. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 
 and the marketplace of ideas protect First Amendment 
11, at 5; Jayne Seminare Docherty, Narratives, 
Metaphors, and Negotiation, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 847, 847–48 (2004) (applying conceptual 
metaphor theory to negotiation practice). 
 13. Gerald V. O’Brien, Metaphors and the Pejorative Framing of Marginalized Groups:  
Implications for Social Work Education, 45 J. SOC. WORK EDUC. 29, 32 (2009). 
 14. See Charles L. Briggs, Communicability, Racial Discourse, and Disease, 34 ANN. 
REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 269, 272 (2005) (explaining how narratives become authoritative 
through the processes of appropriation and reception). 
 15. Brennan, supra note 6, at IX (recounting Justice Rehnquist’s explanation). 
 16. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 157–58. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See Robert L. Tsai, Fire, Metaphor, and Constitutional Myth-Making, 93 GEO. L.J. 
181, 235 (2004) (arguing that legal metaphors are both regressive and dynamic). 
 19. HAIG BOSMAJIAN, METAPHOR AND REASON IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS 200 (1992) 
(discussing the prevalence of metaphors in legal texts). 
 20. See Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); Linda L. 
Berger, What Is the Sound of a Corporation Speaking?  How the Cognitive Theory of 
Metaphor Can Help Lawyers Shape the Law, 2 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 169, 
171 (2004) (criticizing the use of metaphors to associate corporations with people). 
 21. BOSMAJIAN, supra note 19, at 73–94 (noting the prevalence of the wall metaphor in 
the Supreme Court’s analysis of the Establishment Clause); Michael R. Smith, Levels of 
Metaphor in Persuasive Legal Writing, 58 MERCER L. REV. 919, 925–26 (2007) (analyzing 
the wall metaphor). 
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rights.22  States are laboratories.23  The list goes on and on.  Immigration is 
no exception to metaphor’s ubiquity in the law.24
 This Article explores the prevailing metaphors of immigration law and 
examines the social and legal consequences of their use.  Employing a 
critical discourse framework, I assert that three immigration metaphors 
dominate Supreme Court texts:  IMMIGRANTS ARE ALIENS, IMMIGRATION IS 
A FLOOD, and IMMIGRATION IS AN INVASION. 
   
Part I of this Article establishes a method for understanding these terms 
by introducing the conceptual theory of metaphor.  According to cognitive 
linguists, human thought is defined by metaphors.25  I evaluate Stephen 
Winter’s claim that legal reasoning is grounded in metaphors that derive 
from our “embodied” experiences as physical, social, and cultural beings.26
Working from the critical framework established in Part I, Part II 
analyzes the conceptual metaphors of three modern Supreme Court 
opinions.  In undoubtedly the most important constitutional decision 
affecting unauthorized immigrants in the last century,
  
Applying Winter’s theory to immigration metaphors, I explain why the 
dangers of distortion and conflation—risks associated with all metaphors—
are heightened in the immigration context. 
27 the Supreme Court 
referred to a “shadow population” of millions of “illegal aliens”28 that 
constituted “an ever-increasing flood.”29  In its most important labor law 
decision involving immigrants, the Court described the criminality of 
“illegal aliens.”30
 
 22. See BOSMAJIAN, supra note 
  Finally, in the deportation context, the Supreme Court 
analogized the detention of immigrants to the discovery of “contraband 
19, at 200 (questioning whether the marketplace 
metaphor is appropriate in modern society). 
 23. See generally James A. Gardner, The “States-as-Laboratories” Metaphor in State 
Constitutional Law, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 475 (1996). 
 24. Although legal scholars have not analyzed immigration metaphors comprehensively, 
several have offered thoughtful analyses of various aspects of immigration discourse. See, 
e.g., Linda S. Bosniak, Opposing Prop. 187:  Undocumented Immigrants and the National 
Imagination, 28 CONN. L. REV. 555, 565–90 (1996) (analyzing the rhetoric of opponents of 
immigration restrictionists); Kevin R. Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration Laws:  
The Social and Legal Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 
272–73 (1997) [hereinafter Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration Laws]; Kevin R. 
Johnson, The New Nativism:  Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, 
Something Blue, in IMMIGRANTS OUT!:  THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT 
IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 165 (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997); Hiroshi Motomura, 
Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2037, 2085–87 (2008) (discussing the 
dueling rhetorical formulations of “rule of law” rhetoric in immigration debates); Gerald L. 
Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws:  Government Services, Proposition 187, and the Structure of 
Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1428 (1995). 
 25. ZOLTÁN KÖVECSES, METAPHOR:  A PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION viii (2002) 
(summarizing the “cognitive linguistic view of metaphor”). 
 26. Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the 
Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1130–36, 1142–56 (1988). 
 27. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 28. Id. at 218 (emphasis added). 
 29. Id. at 249 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 30. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 143 (2002) (emphasis 
added). 
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explosives or drugs.”31
In Part III, I explain how the Supreme Court’s metaphors interact with 
metaphors from other important cultural institutions like Congress to create 
a social understanding of “the immigration problem” and the necessary 
solutions to the problem.
  I explain that, rather than stand as outliers, these 
cases join a much larger body of Supreme Court decisions that use 
metaphors to describe immigration in terms of criminality, flood, and 
attack. 
32
The Article concludes by proposing several avenues for discursive 
change.  First, I assert that similes are more effective vehicles for 
understanding immigration-related concepts than metaphors.  Because 
similes stimulate analogic reasoning, they are less likely than metaphors to 
encourage cognitive shortcuts and conflate ideas.  Given that human 
reasoning depends on figurative associations, however, metaphors will 
remain fundamental components of discourse and thought.  Because of 
metaphor’s omnipresence in law, I argue that speakers must develop an 
oppositional metaphoric framework to compete with dominant accounts.
  For example, if immigrants are viewed as 
illegal alien criminals, then they should be captured and deported.  If 
immigration is an invasion from the south, then the government should 
construct a virtual fence across the border to resist the Mexican offensive.  
These “common sense” responses are made possible by selective 
metaphoric framing. 
33
In contrast to existing terms that describe nonhumans who attack, 
migration describes people who move.  Whereas the Supreme Court’s 
current immigration metaphors focus on criminality, economic sanctuary 
focuses on the human consequences of globalization and the displacement 
of workers.  Finally, while current frames signify a loss of economic 
security and cultural hegemony, the proposed terms highlight immigrants’ 
economic contributions and potential for social belonging. 
  
I suggest two alternative metaphors:  unauthorized immigrants should be 
referred to as migrants, and illegal immigration should instead be thought 
of as a process of obtaining economic sanctuary. 
In the midst of heated immigration debates and calls for greater 
restrictions, we should pause for a moment to consider the role metaphors 
play in the social and legal construction of noncitizens.  As George Lakoff 
and Mark Johnson—the pioneers of conceptual metaphor theory—remind 
us, “[P]eople in power get to impose their metaphors.”34
 
 31. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1046 (1984) (emphasis added). 
  The Supreme 
Court has imposed many immigration metaphors on the legal community.  
 32. GEORGE LAKOFF & SAM FERGUSON, THE FRAMING OF IMMIGRATION 1–2 (2006) 
(analyzing the “Immigration Problem Frame”); Lisa Marie Cacho, ‘The People of California 
Are Suffering’:  The Ideology of White Injury in Discourses of Immigration, 4 CULTURAL 
VALUES 389, 394 (2000) (explaining how immigration metaphors rationalize 
“commonsense” responses). 
 33. See Phyllis Pease Chock, Ambiguity in Policy Discourse:  Congressional Talk About 
Immigration, 28 POL’Y SCI. 165, 180 (1995) (explaining how personal narratives can serve as 
oppositional frameworks). 
 34. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 157. 
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This Article seeks to critically evaluate the metaphors of immigration law 
so that competing frames might emerge. 
I.  CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS AND THE LAW 
A.  The Traditional and Cognitive Accounts 
Metaphors are typically described as figures of speech used to understand 
one concept in terms of another.35  The most common metaphoric 
expression employs an “A is a B” format.36  Thus, the expression “life is a 
dance” makes the association between “life” and “dance” explicit.37  But a 
person might also say, “I’m going to find a life partner” or “You take the 
lead,” thereby associating living with dancing more indirectly.  Regardless 
of the format, however, the classical rhetorical definition of metaphor 
involves a tacit comparison between two concepts.38
Philosophers of language have long studied the role metaphor plays in 
communicating ideas.
 
39  Aristotle, the father of the traditional approach, 
described metaphor as a method for producing understanding “through the 
generic similarity.”40  Under this view, metaphor has both descriptive and 
normative components.  On the descriptive side, metaphors are simply 
linguistic expressions used for nonliteral comparisons.41  Normatively, the 
traditional view holds that metaphors are linguistically deviant because they 
inhibit language’s primary function, which is to accurately represent 
reality.42
The conventional wisdom on metaphor took a radical turn in the mid-
twentieth century when theorists questioned the foregoing descriptive and 
normative accounts.  Although traditionalists viewed metaphor as a 
rhetorical device, later theorists described metaphor in cognitive terms.  The 
influential twentieth-century philosopher and literary critic I.A. Richards 
asserted that metaphor involves a “borrowing between and intercourse of 
thoughts, a transaction between contexts.”
 
43
 
 35. See Michael Boudin, Antitrust Doctrine and the Sway of Metaphor, 75 GEO. L.J. 
395, 405 (1986) (discussing the classical definition of metaphor); Bernard J. Hibbitts, 
Making Sense of Metaphors:  Visuality, Aurality, and the Reconfiguration of American Legal 
Discourse, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 229, 233 (1994) (defining metaphor). 
  According to Richards, we 
 36. Clay Calvert, Regulating Cyberspace:  Metaphor, Rhetoric, Reality, and the 
Framing of Legal Options, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 541, 547 (1998) (outlining 
metaphoric formatting). 
 37. Hibbitts, supra note 35, at 234 (noting that metaphors create images that emphasize 
specific qualities of particular referents). 
 38. See Andreas Musolff, What Role Do Metaphors Play in Racial Prejudice?  The 
Function of Antisemitic Imagery in Hitler’s Mein Kampf, 41 PATTERNS OF PREJUDICE 21, 23 
(2007) (discussing metaphor’s ubiquity in social discourse). 
 39. Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 
CAL. L. REV., 439, 462–65 (2003) (discussing the historical development of metaphor in law 
and philosophy). 
 40. ARISTOTLE, THE “ART” OF RHETORIC 235 (H.C. Lawson-Tancred trans., 1991). 
 41. Hunter, supra note 39, at 463. 
 42. Id. (discussing the “linguistic deviance” of metaphors and tracing the traditional 
view to Aristotle). 
 43. I.A. RICHARDS, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RHETORIC 94 (1965). 
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think metaphorically, and the figurative expressions we utter represent 
underlying cognitive processes.44  Max Black extended Richards’s initial 
assault on the traditionalist approach by describing metaphoric meaning not 
in terms of shared literal properties but in terms of shared concepts and 
relationships.45  Black analyzed the phrase “man is a wolf” to illustrate 
what is known as the “interaction” theory of metaphor.46  Under this 
approach, when listeners hear “man is a wolf,” they associate certain 
characteristics and relationships with “man,” which then interact with 
characteristics and relationships that they unconsciously associate with 
“wolf.”47  The interaction of these “associated commonplaces” produces a 
unique meaning that cannot be explained through paraphrase.48
Although the interaction theory of metaphor challenged many core 
assumptions of the traditional view—that metaphors are solely ornamental, 
linguistic, and comparative
 
49—Richards and Black left other questions 
unanswered.  Namely:  how does the human mind select certain 
characteristics of a particular domain, while ignoring other potential 
“associated commonplaces”?  Thus, in the phrase “man is a wolf,” why do 
we map concepts such as anger and ferocity from wolf to man, but filter out 
other characteristics such as “has legs,” “breathes air,” or “drinks water”?50
In their pioneering book Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff and Johnson 
applied research in philosophy and cognitive linguistics to the study of 
metaphor.
  
Cognitive linguists addressed these and other questions in the latter half of 
the twentieth century. 
51  Although prior theorists had discussed the cognitive nature of 
metaphors, Lakoff and Johnson were the first to offer a comprehensive, 
empirically tested approach.52  According to their account, metaphors live 
in the mind but reveal themselves in words and phrases.53
 
 44. Id. 
  We scale our 
conceptual metaphors according to familiarity, with abstract concepts 
 45. See Berger, supra note 20, at 174–77 (summarizing Black’s theory). 
 46. MAX BLACK, MODELS AND METAPHORS:  STUDIES IN LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHY 
39–44 (1962). 
 47. Berger, supra note 20, at 175–76 (analyzing the man is a wolf metaphor); Hunter, 
supra note 39, at 468–69 (same). 
 48. BLACK, supra note 46, at 44–46; see also Berger, supra note 20, at 176; Linda L. 
Berger, Of Metaphor, Metonymy, and Corporate Money:  Rhetorical Choices in Supreme 
Court Decisions on Campaign Finance Regulation, 58 MERCER L. REV. 949, 955 (2007) 
(discussing Black’s theory). 
 49. David T. Ritchie, Who Is on the Outside Looking in, and What Do They See?:  
Metaphors of Exclusion in Legal Education, 58 MERCER L. REV. 991, 992 (2007) (describing 
the traditional view of metaphor as “a mere trick designed to conceal or cover over the 
truth”). 
 50. Hunter, supra note 39, at 469 (discussing the limitations of Black’s theory). 
 51. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 3–9; see also Otto Santa Ana et al., Awash 
Under a Brown Tide:  Immigration Metaphors in California Public and Print Media 
Discourse, 23 AZTLÁN 137, 142 (1998) (arguing that Lakoff and Johnson’s work “signaled 
the advent of cognitive science in understanding how metaphors shape everyday thinking”). 
 52. See KÖVECSES, supra note 25, at xi (discussing the significance of Lakoff and 
Johnson’s work). 
 53. George Lakoff, The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor, in METAPHOR AND 
THOUGHT 202, 203 (Andrew Ortony ed., 2d ed. 1993). 
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understood in terms of more concrete experiences.54  Thus, in the metaphor 
TIME IS MONEY, the abstract concept (time) is viewed in terms of a better-
understood concept grounded in the real world (money).55  Lakoff and 
Johnson refer to the more obscure concept (i.e., the one the listener is trying 
to understand) as the “target domain” (time) and the idea or experience 
from which the listener borrows attributes as the “source domain” 
(money).56  Conceptual metaphors, thus, involve multiple mappings 
between domains.57
Cognitive linguists emphasize the difference between conceptual 
metaphors and their linguistic expressions.
 
58  Conceptual metaphors 
involve the process of understanding one conceptual domain in terms of 
another.59  Linguistic expressions are the words or phrases that reflect the 
conceptual metaphor.60  For example, a speaker might express the 
conceptual metaphor THE MIND IS A CONTAINER by stating:  “He’s empty-
headed” or “She’s full of ideas.”61  Whether or not the speaker actually 
utters the conceptual metaphor, researchers can identify the underlying idea 
based on the number of linguistic metaphoric expressions that refer to it.  
Thus, conceptual metaphors are “ways of thinking” about concepts, while 
linguistic expressions are “ways of talking” about them.62  If a large 
number of similar metaphoric expressions or “tokens” of conceptual 
metaphors exist, then they likely evince an underlying conceptual 
association.63
The conceptual theory of metaphor addresses two key issues that prior 
theories had failed to resolve:  (1) the process through which the human 
mind selects certain source domains over others, and (2) the criteria used to 
map certain attributes within domains while ignoring others.  According to 
 
 
 54. Hugh G. Petrie & Rebecca S. Oshlag, Metaphor and Learning, in METAPHOR AND 
THOUGHT 579, 589 (Andrew Ortony ed., 2d ed. 1993) (“[M]etaphor is what enables one to 
pass from the more familiar to the unfamiliar . . . .”). 
 55. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 7–9. 
 56. See KÖVECSES, supra note 25, at 4 (discussing “conceptual domains”). 
 57. See Dan Hunter, Reason Is Too Large:  Analogy and Precedent in Law, 50 EMORY 
L.J. 1197, 1212 (2001) (explaining how features of source domains are mapped onto target 
domains); Steven L. Winter, Re-Embodying Law, 58 MERCER L. REV. 869, 882 (2006) 
(discussing mappings). 
 58. See KÖVECSES, supra note 25, at 4–6; O’Brien, supra note 13, at 32 (distinguishing 
between conceptual and linguistic metaphors). 
 59. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 5. 
 60. KÖVECSES, supra note 25, at 4. 
 61. George Lakoff & Mark Johnson, The Metaphorical Structure of the Human 
Conceptual System, 4 COGNITIVE SCI. 195, 196–97 (1980) (examining various examples of 
ontological metaphors). 
 62. KÖVECSES, supra note 25, at 6 (describing metaphoric expressions as evidence of 
conceptual metaphors). 
 63. Thomas H. Smith, When Experts Educate, What Do Their Metaphors Say?  Complex 
Metaphor Structure in the Professional Conflict Resolution Literature, 17 IBÉRICA 175, 176–
77 (2009). 
1554 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
Lakoff and Johnson, the notion of “experientialism” explains these 
unconscious metaphoric choices.64
Experientialism holds that our understanding of the world is rooted in our 
interactions with physical, social, and cultural environments.
 
65  For 
example, when a parent holds a child, the child feels affection and warmth 
at the same time.66  By experiencing these stimuli simultaneously, the child 
conflates the ideas of affection and warmth.  The conceptual metaphor 
AFFECTION IS WARMTH gives rise to statements such as:  “Our relationship 
has cooled recently” and “I received a warm reception from the 
audience.”67  Because the human mind operates in conjunction with a 
physical body that dwells in the physical world, physical and spatial 
perceptions largely determine our metaphoric understandings.68
Source domains can be culturally grounded as well.  In fact, the notion of 
experientialism extends to every environment a human being encounters, 
whether physical, cultural, social, economic, or moral.
 
69  For example, 
Western speakers often articulate the concept TIME IS MONEY through a 
series of linguistic expressions such as “She spent her time wisely” or “I 
should budget my time more effectively.”70  Listeners draw meaning from 
these statements based on shared cultural understandings of money and 
business.  Yet non-capitalist societies have very different perceptions of 
transactions and therefore do not describe the concept of time in economic 
terms.71  Whether metaphors are grounded in physical, social, or cultural 
knowledge, listeners will evaluate the accuracy of a particular metaphoric 
statement based on their embodied knowledge.72
 
 64. See Marina Rakova, The Philosophy of Embodied Realism:  A High Price to Pay?, 
13 COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS 215, 216 (2002) (discussing Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of 
“experientialism” or “embodied realism”). 
  As explained below, this 
experiential approach to human reasoning provides a useful tool for 
evaluating the operation of legal metaphors in general and immigration 
metaphors in particular. 
 65. Mark Johnson, Law Incarnate, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 949, 950 (2002) (“[O]ur 
conceptualization and reasoning are grounded in our bodily experience, shaped by patterns 
of perception and action.”). 
 66. See Mark L. Johnson, Mind, Metaphor, Law, 58 MERCER L. REV. 845, 859–60 
(2007) (discussing associations between domains). 
 67. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH:  THE EMBODIED 
MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT 48–49 (1999); see also Johnson, supra 
note 66, at 859–60 (explaining how physical associations give rise to many primary 
metaphors). 
 68. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 14–21 (discussing orientational metaphors); 
Stuart J. Kaplan, Let Me Hear Your Web Sights:  Visual and Aural Metaphors for the 
Internet, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 299, 306–08 (2004) (same). 
 69. Johnson, supra note 66, at 846 (“Our embodiment shapes both what and how we 
experience, think, mean, imagine, reason, and communicate.”). 
 70. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 7–9 (analyzing the TIME IS MONEY 
metaphor); BRUCE MCCONACHIE, AMERICAN THEATER IN THE CULTURE OF THE COLD WAR:  
PRODUCING AND CONTESTING CONTAINMENT, 1947–1962, at 14–15 (2003) (discussing the 
cultural grounding of metaphor). 
 71. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 7–9. 
 72. See id. 
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B.  The Metaphoric Nature of Legal Reasoning 
Much like traditional philosophers of language, early legal commentators 
viewed metaphor with great skepticism.  Lord Mansfield opined that 
“nothing in law is so apt to mislead as a metaphor,”73 Jeremy Bentham 
stated tersely that “[m]etaphors are not [r]easons,”74 and Justice Benjamin 
Cardozo warned that metaphors “end often by enslaving [thought].”75
Early critics of legal metaphors embraced a rationalist view of law that 
dismissed metaphors as distracting rhetorical flourishes.
 
76  Rationalists 
viewed the law as a product of logical, impartial discernment.77  According 
to this account, lawyers are not reality-makers but rather creative 
applicators of a rule-based system.78
In his groundbreaking application of research in cognitive linguistics to 
the law, Steven Winter offered an alternative account of the role played by 
metaphor in legal thought.
  As such, metaphors cannot create 
multiple realities because the law embodies a singular version of reality. 
79  According to Winter, those who dismiss legal 
metaphors as rhetorical trifles rely on flawed assumptions about human 
rationality.  Winter argues that legal reasoning is grounded in human 
interactions, which become institutionalized first in social practices, and 
later in cultural and legal norms.80  Just as human reasoning is metaphoric, 
so too is the law.81  Because we think metaphorically based on our 
“embodied interactions” with physical, social, and cultural environments, 
the law also derives from these experiences.82  The law’s metaphoric 
grounding allows for dynamic change as social practices and cultural 
understandings develop.83  As Winter states, “Actual examination of legal 
metaphors—how they work, how they come to be, how they come to be 
meaningful and persuasive to us as embodied, socially-situated human 
beings—shows that . . . metaphor is both the product and embodiment of 
constraint.”84
 
 73. Knox v. Gye, (1871) 5 L.R.E. & I. App. 656, 676 (H.L.); see also Thomas Ross, 
Metaphor and Paradox, 23 GA. L. REV. 1053, 1057 n.9 (1989) (discussing early criticisms of 
metaphors in law). 
 
 74. JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 69–71 (1911). 
 75. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926). 
 76. See Ross, supra note 73, at 1057 n.9 (examining the formalist view of metaphor). 
 77. See Berger, supra note 20, at 178 (discussing legal fundamentalism). 
 78. See MILNER S. BALL, LYING DOWN TOGETHER:  LAW, METAPHOR, AND THEOLOGY 8 
(1985) (characterizing objectivism as the “received tradition” of law). 
 79. See generally STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST:  LAW, LIFE, AND MIND 
(2001); Winter, supra note 26; Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem 
of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988) [hereinafter Winter, The Metaphor of 
Standing]; Steven L. Winter, The “Power” Thing, 82 VA. L. REV. 721 (1996). 
 80. WINTER, supra note 79, at 193. 
 81. See id. at 197 (arguing that legal reasoning does not operate in a rule-like way). 
 82. Johnson, supra note 65, at 958. 
 83. See Winter, supra note 57, at 895–96 (challenging both the objectivist and 
subjectivist accounts of law). 
 84. Id. at 897. 
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According to this experientialist account, there is no law without 
metaphor.85  Metaphors do not misrepresent the law; metaphor is the law 
because human reasoning is essentially metaphoric.  At its core, then, the 
conceptual theory of metaphor “humanizes” the law by situating it within 
social institutions and ordinary thought processes.86
Winter’s experiential understanding of legal metaphors raises several 
questions about the metaphoric construction of immigrants in the law.  If 
human beings comprehend foreign concepts through metaphors, then we 
would expect the law to employ many metaphors to describe immigrants 
and immigration (i.e., people and processes perceived as “different” or 
“foreign” and therefore in need of greater explanation).  In addition, if 
source domains are experientially grounded, then we would expect 
immigration metaphors to reference basic human experiences such as 
survival and self-protection, as well as basic culturally constructed concepts 
such as race and ethnicity.  As seen below, the Supreme Court’s 
immigration metaphors bear these hypotheses out, producing reified images 
of immigrants that legal actors have largely adopted through unconscious 
associations. 
 
C.  Immigration Metaphors and the Dangers of Conflation 
Cognitive linguists warn that metaphors can mislead as well as 
enlighten.87  As a selective process that emphasizes certain aspects of 
source and target domains, while masking others, metaphors do not tell 
stories completely.  For example, the metaphor IMMIGRATION IS A FLOOD 
utilizes certain characteristics of “flood” (the source domain), while 
underutilizing others.  Thus, the metaphor brings focus to a flood’s 
destructive qualities, while ignoring the fact that floods often recede and 
leave fertile soil in their wake.  Such mappings never capture the entire 
source.  The same is true for the selective highlighting of target domains.  
The metaphor IMMIGRANTS ARE ILLEGAL ALIENS, for example, highlights 
the criminal characteristics of some immigrants (the target domain), while 
ignoring the fact that most immigrants reside legally in the United States.88
Metaphors are most likely to deceive listeners when they conflate two 
domains entirely.  If the target domain becomes the source domain in the 
listener’s mind, then the mapping process changes from metaphoric to 
literal.
 
89
 
 85. See Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime Metaphors, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 
1035, 1063 (2002) (summarizing the cognitivist description of metaphor as a “feature of 
reason itself”). 
  An inverse relationship exists between a metaphor’s potential to 
 86. Johnson, supra note 65, at 951–53 (explaining how cultural understandings constrain 
legal concepts). 
 87. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing, supra note 79, at 1387. 
 88. Randy Capps, U.S. Immigrant Workers and Families:  Demographics, Labor Market 
Participation, and Children’s Education, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 170, 170 (2007) (stating 
that approximately thirty percent of U.S. immigrants lack legal status). 
 89. See STEPHEN ULLMAN, LANGUAGE AND STYLE 237–38 (1964) (“By unthinkingly and 
mechanically repeating the same image, we may in the end forget that it is 
metaphorical . . . .”). 
2011] THE JURISPRUDENCE OF OTHERNESS 1557 
mislead and the extent to which readers understand it as a metaphoric 
representation, rather than as a semi-literal representation.90
Here I explain why the risk of distortion associated with all metaphors is 
heightened in the immigration context.  Most immigration metaphors are 
what I call “personal metaphors,” meaning figurative representations that 
describe people or social processes.  For example, the Supreme Court 
describes immigration using metaphors such as illegal alien, northbound 
tide, and silent invasion.
 
91  The target domains of these metaphors (i.e., the 
subjects that the metaphors are trying to explain) are not novel rules or legal 
principles, but rather involve immigrants themselves.  As explained 
below,92
The personal nature of immigration metaphors differs sharply from the 
doctrinal nature of most legal metaphors.  By “doctrinal metaphor” I mean a 
figurative statement that attempts to summarize a legal rule or concept (e.g., 
marketplace of ideas, wall of separation, stream of commerce).
 immigration opinions often literalize these personal metaphors:  
through metaphor, the immigrant becomes the alien, the alien becomes the 
illegal, and the illegal becomes the Mexican. 
93  In 
contrast to the personal nature of immigration metaphors, doctrinal 
metaphors have received widespread evaluation and criticism from the legal 
community, thereby reducing the risk that these metaphors will pass 
unconsciously into the legal imagination.  For example, even though the 
marketplace of ideas metaphor94 is an established part of the First 
Amendment vernacular, it remains a statement that readers can observe and 
assess.  When the marketplace metaphor appears in written opinions, it 
stands as an obvious shortcut to a broader legal principle, thereby inviting 
criticism and proposals for change.  Demonstrating the testability of the 
metaphor, Cass Sunstein has argued that the marketplace concept 
improperly commodifies the First Amendment,95 and Kathleen Sullivan has 
argued that speech is more like self-government than a sale of goods.96
 
 90. See Martha Grace Duncan, In Slime and Darkness:  The Metaphor of Filth in 
Criminal Justice, 68 TUL. L. REV. 725, 795 (1994) (arguing that readers often mistake 
metaphors for “more literal approximations of reality”). 
  
These assessments are made possible because, like all doctrinal metaphors, 
 91. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 38 (2000) (emphasis added) (referring 
to “the northbound tide of illegal entrants”); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 904 (1975) 
(Burger, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (internal citation and quotations omitted) 
(referring to the “silent invasion of illegal aliens”). 
 92. See infra Part II.D.1 (examining different permutations of the alien metaphor). 
 93. See Smith, supra note 21, at 921–23 (defining “doctrinal metaphors” and describing 
them as both “powerful” and “dangerous”). 
 94. See Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757, 
1759 (1995) (discussing the history of the marketplace metaphor); see also Tsai, supra note 
18, at 230 (referring to the marketplace metaphor as the “single most recognized metaphor in 
all of constitutional law”). 
 95. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 17–18 
(1993); see also Jonathan H. Blavin & I. Glenn Cohen, Gore, Gibson, and Goldsmith:  The 
Evolution of Internet Metaphors in Law and Commentary, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 265, 267 
(2002) (explaining how metaphors can mislead readers). 
 96. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech and Unfree Markets, 42 UCLA L. REV. 949, 
963 (1995). 
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the marketplace metaphor summarizes a legal concept that lawyers, judges, 
and scholars are predisposed to identify and debate. 
Even if doctrinal metaphors pass unwittingly into everyday use, they 
never conflate source and target domains completely.  For example, we 
know when we speak of a wall of separation that we are not talking about a 
wall literally.  Legal critics continue to question the wall metaphor, despite 
its ubiquity.97  Likewise, scholars have questioned whether corporations are 
really people98 and whether property rights are really bundles of sticks.99
In contrast to doctrinal metaphors, the images of ethnicity and danger 
contained in immigration metaphors create the impression that immigrants 
can only be described in terms of alienage and criminality.  Thus, although 
scholars have paid substantial attention to doctrinal metaphors, immigration 
metaphors have generated significantly less critical evaluation. 
 
I propose two explanations for why immigration metaphors are more 
likely to conflate source and target domains, while enjoying uncritical 
acceptance.  First, doctrinal metaphors attempt to neatly summarize 
complex rules or concepts—a purpose arguably necessary to the 
interpretation and enforcement of laws.  They are “cognitively efficient” 
because they establish criteria for resolving unpredictable problems that are 
yet to occur.100  As such, doctrinal metaphors are indicative of a “healthy 
legal culture” because they facilitate a shared understanding of legal norms 
and explain difficult legal concepts.101
Second, although metaphors are a natural product of experiential 
knowledge, not all experiences exist on equal cognitive planes.  The social 
and cultural understandings associated with immigration metaphors are 
more likely to involve race, ethnicity, and self-protection—source domains 
that operate on deeply unconscious levels because of the mind’s tendency to 
sort this type of information based on invisible categorical structures.
  In contrast, there is no way to 
“neatly summarize” a group of noncitizens with varied backgrounds and 
objectives.  Thus, unlike doctrinal metaphors, the goals of immigration 
metaphors are neither necessary nor attainable; metaphors that attempt to 
capture the essence of immigrants will inevitably miss the mark and 
therefore distort. 
102  
The intergroup judgments that flow from racialized perspectives are largely 
unintentional and non-motivational.103
 
 97. See Stephen J. Safranek, Can Science Guide Legal Argumentation?  The Role of 
Metaphor in Constitutional Cases, 25 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 357, 372 (1994) (discussing criticism 
of the wall metaphor). 
  If legal actors are unable to 
 98. Berger, supra note 20, at 187 (considering the implications of using metaphors to 
associate corporations with people). 
 99. Safranek, supra note 97, at 399–403. 
 100. Berger, supra note 20, at 173 (discussing metaphor’s cognitive benefits). 
 101. Tsai, supra note 18, at 189–90; see also BOSMAJIAN, supra note 19, at 46–47 
(arguing that metaphors are necessary for explaining abstractions). 
 102. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:  A Cognitive Bias 
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 
1216–20 (1995) (applying social cognition theory to discrimination claims under Title VII). 
 103. See id. at 1187–88. 
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recognize the mind’s methods for sorting information related to outside 
social groups, then they are equally unable to question the assumptions 
upon which many immigration metaphors depend.  As such, lawyers and 
scholars have found it much easier to question assumptions contained in 
doctrinal metaphors, such as whether ideas are commodities, than to 
question the assumptions embedded in immigration metaphors, such as 
whether immigrants are criminals or whether all illegal aliens come from 
Mexico. 
The foregoing discussion has established a framework for understanding 
immigration metaphors from a cognitive perspective.  According to the 
theoretical approach outlined above, immigration metaphors tend to 
highlight certain characteristics of noncitizens, while conflating and 
distorting others.  Until now, this discussion has been entirely a matter of 
theory.  It is now time to evaluate the metaphors of immigration law in 
practice. 
II.  DECONSTRUCTING THE SUPREME COURT’S IMMIGRATION METAPHORS 
Law is told through stories, and stories are told through metaphors.  Here 
I analyze the metaphors of immigration stories told by the Supreme Court.  
These opinions address vastly different areas of the law and reach vastly 
different conclusions about the extent of rights that immigrants should 
enjoy.  I tell an “immigrant-friendly” story that has been called a 
“conceptual watershed in immigration law” for its focus on the universal 
rights of noncitizens.104  I tell an “anti-immigrant” story that has been 
labeled a “human rights . . . crisis in immigration policy” for denying 
unauthorized immigrants basic workplace remedies.105
What links these stories is not legal subject matter or judicial perspective.  
Rather, these immigration stories demonstrate how Supreme Court Justices 
with very different legal philosophies often engage in the shared endeavor 
of constructing immigrants through metaphors.  Justice Rehnquist, the 
author of the “anti-immigrant” story, described “illegal aliens” as criminals 
who trick businesses.
 
106  Justice William Brennan, the author of the 
“immigrant-friendly” story (and Justice Rehnquist’s intellectual rival on the 
left of the Court)107 wrote of a “shadow population of illegal migrants” who 
live within our borders.108
 
 104. Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 54–
58 (1984); see also LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN:  DILEMMAS OF 
CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 64–68 (2006) (summarizing reactions to Plyler v. Doe, 457 
U.S. 202 (1982)). 
  These cases—ranging from constitutional law, 
 105. LANCE COMPA, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE:  WORKERS’ FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS xxi (2004) (criticizing 
the outcome in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002)). 
 106. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 147–48 (emphasis added). 
 107. Newton, supra note 6 (discussing the rivalry between Justices Rehnquist and 
Brennan). 
 108. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218 (1982) (emphasis added) (internal citation and 
quotations omitted). 
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to labor law, to immigration law—suggest that the metaphoric construction 
of immigrants is a conceptual process that cuts across ideological lines. 
After telling three immigration stories, I explain how the metaphors 
contained therein join a much larger body of metaphors in Supreme Court 
opinions.  I selected these cases based on their impact and relevance.  To 
that end, I considered Supreme Court opinions authored after 1965—the 
year Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to 
eliminate national origin quotas.109  That year is widely regarded as the 
beginning of the modern era of immigration law.110  Older cases contain 
metaphoric language as well, much of which is explicitly racist.111
The conceptual metaphors that emerge from a critical evaluation of 
numerous Supreme Court texts are:  IMMIGRANTS ARE ALIENS, 
IMMIGRATION IS A FLOOD, and IMMIGRATION IS AN INVASION.  Applying 
the framework established above, I explain how the Court’s metaphors 
draw from embodied knowledge to construct a psychologically reductive 
image of immigrants in the legal imagination.  In order to understand this 
symbol-making process and consider discursive alternatives, we now turn 
to the symbols themselves. 
  Such 
decisions, however, do not provide the same insight into the contemporary 
construction of immigrants in the law. 
A.  Plyler:  Educating the Shadow Population 
In 1977, a rural school district in Texas began charging $1000 tuition to 
unauthorized immigrant children attending public school.112  The Tyler 
Independent School District adopted the requirement after the Texas 
legislature voted to limit free public education to “[e]very child in this state 
who is a citizen of the United States or a legally admitted alien.”113  By 
altering the Texas Education Code in this way, the state legislature 
effectively cut off funding to local school districts that wanted to educate 
every child, regardless of status.  As such, Tyler and other Texas towns 
enacted measures designed to prevent the state from becoming a “haven for 
illegal aliens.”114
Parents of sixteen unauthorized immigrant children in Tyler brought suit 
against Superintendent James Plyler.
 
115
 
 109. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 2, 79 Stat. 911. 
  All of the children were under the 
 110. See, e.g., Hugh Davis Graham, Affirmative Action for Immigrants?  The Unintended 
Consequences of Reform, in COLOR LINES:  AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, IMMIGRATION, AND CIVIL 
RIGHTS OPTIONS FOR AMERICA 53, 66 (John David Skrentny ed., 2001) (discussing the 
impact of the 1965 amendments to immigration law). 
 111. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 738 (1893) (Brewer, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added) (“And it may be that the national government . . . has the 
power to build, as it were, a Chinese wall around our borders and absolutely forbid aliens to 
enter.”); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (emphasis added) 
(referring to “vast hordes of . . . people crowding in upon us”). 
 112. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 574 (E.D. Tex. 1978). 
 113. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 205 & n.1 (citing Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.031 (Vernon Supp. 
1981)). 
 114. Doe, 458 F. Supp. at 572 (internal quotations omitted). 
 115. Id. at 574–75. 
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age of fourteen and each lived with a sibling who had legal status.116  The 
families’ decision to sue did not come without risks.  The local U.S. 
Attorney had reportedly asked the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) to deport the plaintiffs and conduct an immigration sweep in Tyler.117  
To the plaintiffs’ lawyers, this was the Latino community’s chance to 
achieve a civil rights victory comparable to Brown v. Board of 
Education118:  an opportunity to challenge an egregious instance of 
discrimination against a subordinated ethnic group.119
The case of Plyler v. Doe
  To supporters of the 
Texas statute, this was one state’s admirable attempt to do what the federal 
government had failed to achieve:  contain the growing illegal alien 
problem. 
120 represented a seven-year legal battle that 
culminated in a 5-4 Supreme Court ruling striking down the Texas statute 
on equal protection grounds.121  Immigration scholars regard Plyler as “the 
ultimate aliens’ rights decision” for opposing “caste legislation in 
America.”122  According to many accounts, the case represents a high-water 
mark in immigration law because of its steadfast focus on universalism and 
equal personhood.123  Despite the praise heaped on Plyler’s holding, 
however, less attention has been paid to the metaphors used to achieve this 
outcome.124
Plyler depicts immigrants in hiding.  The opinion refers to a “shadow 
population of illegal migrants—numbering in the millions—within our 
borders.”
  In fact, an analysis of Plyler’s text reveals that, despite the 
case’s famously egalitarian ends, the decision relies on restrictive 
metaphors to portray a nation overcome by illegal immigration. 
125
 
 116. See Brief for Appellees at 2 & 3 n.9, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1986) (No. 80-
1538), 1980 WL 339676 at *2–3. 
  Because they dwell in the shadows, members of this 
 117. Michael A. Olivas, Plyler v. Doe, The Education of Undocumented Children, and 
the Polity, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 197, 203–04 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 
2005) (discussing Plyler’s case history). 
 118. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 119. Id. at 201. 
 120. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 121. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230. 
 122. BOSNIAK, supra note 104, at 65–66 (internal citation and quotations omitted); see 
also Kevin R. Johnson, Civil Rights and Immigration:  Challenges for the Latino Community 
in the Twenty-First Century, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 42, 44 (1995) (discussing Plyler’s historical 
significance); María Pabón López, Reflections on Educating Latino and Latina 
Undocumented Children:  Beyond Plyler v. Doe, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1373, 1385 (2005) 
(same). 
 123. See BOSNIAK, supra note 104, at 65–67 (noting that critical commentary has both 
castigated and celebrated Plyler’s outcome); Motomura, supra note 24, at 2043 (arguing that 
the Supreme Court has largely contained Plyler’s holding); Nina Rabin et al., Understanding 
Plyler’s Legacy:  Voices from Border Schools, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 15, 15 (2008). 
 124. Although Plyler’s metaphors have not been analyzed in great detail, several scholars 
have discussed the opinion’s competing rhetorical frames. See, e.g., BOSNIAK, supra note 
104, at 66–67 (discussing the role of moral culpability in Plyler); Motomura, supra note 24, 
at 2041–47 (analyzing Plyler’s discussion of unlawful presence, state power, and immigrant 
integration); Schuck, supra note 104, at 55 (analyzing Plyler’s description of immigrant 
parents and children). 
 125. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). 
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population are “defenseless against any abuse, exploitation, or callous 
neglect.”126  Denying them education would create “a subclass of illiterates 
within our boundaries, surely adding to the problems and costs of 
unemployment, welfare, and crime.”127
Plyler is littered with metaphors of paternalism that cast immigrants as 
nameless actors who depend on the Supreme Court for protection.  But 
Plyler’s metaphors do not construct all immigrants equally.  The majority 
opinion contrasts “undocumented children disabled by this 
classification”
 
128
The children who are plaintiffs in these cases are special members of this 
underclass . . . .  [T]hose who elect to enter our territory by stealth and in 
violation of our law should be prepared to bear the consequences, 
including, but not limited to, deportation.  But the children of those illegal 
entrants are not comparably situated.
 with the adult parents who brought the infirmity of illegal 
status on their offspring: 
129
Plyler castigates parents who enter the country illegally through 
“voluntary action.  Indeed, entry into the [undocumented] class is itself a 
crime.” 
 
130  According to Plyler’s metaphors, bad aliens are criminal adults, 
while good aliens are infantilized immigrants who remain quiet and 
vulnerable.131
Although they disagreed on the substantive rights at issue, the Plyler 
Justices shared a common vision of immigration as a dangerous body of 
water.  The word “influx,” which means “an inflow, as of a physical fluid,” 
appears six times in the decision.
  Legal responses emerge naturally from these frames:  good 
immigrants deserve an education; bad aliens deserve swift removal from the 
country. 
132  Justice Brennan wrote of Texas’s 
attempt to “stem the tide of illegal immigration.”133  Chief Justice Warren 
Burger referred to “millions of illegal aliens flooding across our southern 
border” and “an ever-increasing flood of illegal aliens—aliens over whose 
entry or continued presence [the federal government] has no control.”134
Rising floods must be contained, lest they drown the citizenry.  
Accordingly, the solutions proposed in Plyler match the metaphors used to 
define the problem.  The majority described the need to “control[] the 
 
 
 126. Id. at 219 n.18 (quoting Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 585 (E.D. Tex 1978)). 
 127. Id. at 230; see also id. at 241 (Powell, J., concurring) (referring to the “subclass of 
illiterate persons” who would add to the current problems of “unemployment, welfare, and 
crime”). 
 128. Id. at 230 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
 129. Id. at 219–20 (emphasis added). 
 130. Id. at 219 n.19 (emphasis added). 
 131. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Good Aliens, Bad Aliens and the Supreme Court, in IX 
IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 46, 46–47 (L. Tomasi ed., 1987) (discussing the legal 
differentiation between aliens based on relative culpability); see also BOSNIAK, supra note 
104, at 66–67 (examining the “innocent child/culpable adult opposition” in Plyler). 
 132. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 228–49 (majority opinion); 7 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 
941 (2d ed. 1989). 
 133. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 228–29 (emphasis added) (quoting Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 
569, 585 (E.D. Tex 1978)). 
 134. Id. at 249, 253 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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influx of illegal entrants into the State,”135 while the dissenting Justices 
proposed “sealing our vast borders.”136  According to Plyler, however, 
these efforts will ultimately prove unsuccessful given the overwhelming 
strength of the immigrant wave.  Bodies of water are difficult to hold back.  
Thus, notwithstanding “the serious national problems caused by the influx 
of uncountable millions of illegal aliens across our borders,”137 the alien 
inundation remains “virtually uncontrollable.”138
Despite Plyler’s many references to floods, illegal immigration was more 
like a trickle at the time the opinion was written in 1982.  In fact, immigrant 
children from Mexico accounted for less than two percent of the student 
population in Texas schools.
 
139  In contrast to the “influx of uncountable 
millions of illegal aliens” described by the Plyler dissent,140 roughly two 
million unauthorized immigrants lived in the United States in the early 
1980s and accounted for less than fifteen percent of the foreign-born 
population.141
According to the conceptual theory of metaphor, human beings naturally 
map physical experiences onto more abstract domains.
  Immigrants were not an advancing body of water, but an 
identifiable group of people that represented a relatively small proportion of 
noncitizens in the United States.  But Plyler’s water metaphors ignored this 
demographic information.  Through metaphor, waves washed away facts 
and left a new reality in their wake. 
142
Plyler’s story begins with innocent children hiding in the shadows and 
ends with adult criminals deluging the nation.  The more Plyler imbues 
immigrants with a sense of agency, the more menacing the metaphors 
become.  But submersion is not the only basic human experience triggered 
by the Supreme Court’s immigration metaphors.  Human beings also fear 
criminal attack.  In Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB,
  Plyler’s 
metaphors achieve this end by presenting an image of aliens submerging the 
United States.  When human beings are forced under water, they will do 
anything to reach the surface.  By creating the image of a sinking nation, 
Plyler draws on our fear of drowning and our instinct to respond 
aggressively to existential threats. 
143
 
 135. Id. at 228 n.24 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
 the next 
immigration story told here, the Supreme Court employed metaphors of 
stealth and criminality to describe the dangers of illegal immigration. 
 136. Id. at 243 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 137. Id. at 242 (emphasis added). 
 138. Id. at 237 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 139. See Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 575 (E.D. Tex 1978); Brief for Appellees at 3, 
Plyler, 457 U.S. 202 (No. 80-1538), 1980 WL 339676. 
 140. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 242 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 141. See Jorge Chapa, A Demographic and Sociological Perspective on Plyler’s Children, 
1980–2005, 3 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 186, 186–91 (2008) (examining the popular association 
of illegal alienage with Mexican national origin). 
 142. See Hunter, supra note 39, at 474–75 (explaining how legal scholarship often 
describes virtual concepts in physical terms). 
 143. 535 U.S. 137 (2002). 
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B.  Hoffman:  “An Illegal” Tries to Form a Union 
In May 1988, Jose Castro applied for a job at a plastics factory in 
Southern California.144  Castro was a low-skilled employee who worked in 
gardening and construction.  The company, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 
was a family-owned business that made PVC pellets for customers.145  As a 
limited-English speaker with little education, Castro could not complete 
Hoffman’s six-page job application without assistance.146  Hoffman hired 
Castro anyway, and he soon began earning the minimum wage while 
cooking and mixing plastic formulas at Hoffman’s plant.147
Seven months into Castro’s tenure at Hoffman, around Christmas 1988, 
several employees tried to form a union.
 
148  Castro joined the campaign and 
solicited support from his coworkers.149  When they caught wind of the 
nascent union efforts, Hoffman’s managers began interrogating workers.150  
One employee, Moises Gonzalez, identified Castro as a union leader.151  
Several weeks later, Ronald Hoffman, the company president, laid off every 
single organizer.152  Hoffman argued that a decline in business caused the 
layoffs, despite displaying a “Help Wanted” sign before the layoffs and 
hiring new employees shortly thereafter.153  The union lost the campaign 
and the workers never organized.154
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that Hoffman had 
illegally interrogated employees and discharged workers “in order to rid 
itself of known union supporters.”
 
155  At a compliance hearing to determine 
damages, Castro testified that he was born in Mexico and had used a 
friend’s birth certificate to obtain employment at Hoffman.156  Despite this 
admission, the NLRB ordered Hoffman to pay Castro over $60,000 in 
backpay.157  On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, issuing a landmark 
decision that denied monetary remedies to unauthorized immigrants in labor 
cases.158
 
 144. See Catherine L. Fisk & Michael J. Wishnie, The Story of Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB:  Labor Rights Without Remedies for Undocumented Immigrants, 
in LABOR LAW STORIES 399, 408 (Laura J. Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk eds., 2005) (noting 
that Jose Castro’s real name may have been Samuel Perez). 
 
 145. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 208 F.3d 229, 232 (D.C. Cir. 2000); 
Fisk & Wishnie, supra note 144, at 409. 
 146. See Fisk & Wishnie, supra note 144, at 408 (summarizing Hoffman’s procedural 
history). 
 147. Hoffman, 208 F.3d at 232. 
 148. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. and Casimiro Arauz, 306 N.L.R.B. 100, 102 
(1992). 
 149. Id. at 108. 
 150. Id. at 106. 
 151. Id. at 108. 
 152. Id. at 102. 
 153. Id. at 103. 
 154. See Fisk & Wishnie, supra note 144, at 410 (describing the workplace environment 
at Hoffman following the Supreme Court’s decision). 
 155. Hoffman, 306 N.L.R.B. at 100. 
 156. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 208 F.3d 229, 232 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 157. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 141–42 (2002). 
 158. Id. at 151–52. 
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None of the Supreme Court Justices uttered Jose Castro’s name during 
oral argument.  Instead, the two most common terms the Justices used to 
refer to Castro were “the alien” and “the illegal alien.”159  At one point in 
the oral argument, one Justice used the adjective “illegal” as a noun, 
referring to situations in which an “employer did not know that the 
employee was an illegal, hence the employer was not violating the 
immigration law.”160
The Court went on to describe aliens as stealthy criminals.  Unlike 
Plyler, in which immigrants hide from exploitation, Hoffman’s immigrants 
hide their criminality.  The alien is a person who “conceal[s] the facts . . . 
that he’s here illegally and has no right to work.”
 
161  This person tries to 
“phony up more documents and . . . extend for the longest possible time the 
charade that the worker is here lawfully . . . .”162  He “subverts the 
cornerstone” of immigration law, all the while “evading apprehension by 
immigration authorities.”163  At one point in oral argument, Justice Antonin 
Scalia assumed the first-person voice of a crafty, lazy alien:  “I can just sit 
home and eat chocolates and get my back pay.”164
The Court lamented the “massive problem of illegal immigration” in the 
United States.
 
165  One Justice said that “we have to do something to reduce 
this massive number of . . . illegal aliens.”166
A choice of frames is as important for the problems it overlooks as for 
the problems it emphasizes.  Although the Hoffman Court referred to Jose 
Castro as an “illegal alien,” it could just as easily have labeled him a “union 
organizer” or “discrimination victim.”  Likewise, the Court could have 
described the “massive problem” of “employee exploitation” or “blatant 
unfair labor practices.”  By choosing to describe illegal immigration not 
only as a problem, but the problem, Ronald Hoffman’s obvious illegal 
behavior became virtually irrelevant.  Although Jose Castro was an illegal 
alien, Ronald Hoffman was not an illegal employer. 
  Seen from this vantage, 
illegal immigration is a crisis that we, the citizens and victims of illegal 
immigration, must address immediately. 
The conceptual theory of metaphor holds that cognitive understandings 
begin from basic, unmediated human experiences, which lead to the 
formation of more abstract knowledge.167
 
 159. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Hoffman, 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (No. 00-1595), 
2002 WL 77224.  The Justices used the term “illegal alien” fifteen times and the term “alien” 
ten times.  No other term involving illegal immigration was used more than twice. Id. 
  One such basic human 
experience is the fear of criminal attack.  By emphasizing the criminal 
nature of Jose Castro’s wrongdoing and the need to “combat” aliens 
 160. Id. at 12 (emphasis added). 
 161. Id. at 42 (emphasis added). 
 162. Id. at 38 (emphasis added). 
 163. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 148–49 (emphasis added). 
 164. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 159, at 33. 
 165. Id. at 28 (emphasis added). 
 166. Id. at 43 (emphasis added). 
 167. Winter, supra note 26, at 1133 (arguing that the process of “motivation . . . makes 
meaning possible”). 
1566 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
“forcefully,” Hoffman’s metaphors draw upon this survival instinct.168
C.  Lopez-Mendoza:  Immigrants as Toxic Waste 
  
Aliens conceal their criminal activity by silently crossing the border and 
tricking employers like Ronald Hoffman into giving them jobs.  Aware of 
the alien’s cunning ways, the Hoffman Court employed metaphors of 
criminality to highlight the silent threat posed by illegal immigration. 
Many noncitizens could tell Adan Lopez-Mendoza’s immigration story.  
At the age of twenty-four, Lopez-Mendoza left his family in Mexico to find 
work in the United States and send small remittances home when he 
could.169  After departing from Mexico on foot, Lopez-Mendoza eventually 
found a job at a transmission repair shop in San Mateo, California.170
Several months after Lopez-Mendoza arrived in the United States, the 
INS received a tip that seven unauthorized immigrants were employed at 
the business where Lopez-Mendoza worked.
 
171  Believing they lacked 
sufficient information to obtain a search warrant, two INS agents proceeded 
directly to the repair shop without going to court.172  One agent guarded the 
building’s only exit, while the other agent spoke to the owner, Art 
Bradley.173  Bradley refused to grant the agents access to the shop, asking 
instead that they return with a search warrant.  Ignoring Bradley, one agent 
entered the business and began questioning the workers.174  According to 
the agents, Lopez-Mendoza provided suspicious answers and was brought 
to a local INS office for further questioning.  There, he admitted that he had 
entered the United States illegally.  This confession eventually served as the 
primary basis for Lopez-Mendoza’s deportation.175
In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
whether the normal rules for excluding illegally obtained evidence in 
criminal cases applied to civil deportation proceedings.
 
176  According to the 
doctrinal metaphor in criminal law known as the “fruit of the poisonous 
tree,” courts should not admit evidence discovered derivatively from illegal 
searches, arrests, or interrogations.177
 
 168. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 147 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). 
  The tainted evidence (i.e., the target 
of the poisonous tree metaphor) is seen as diseased fruit that must be 
discarded before it harms the judicial process. 
 169. See Joint Appendix at 117, 129, INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (No. 
83-491), 1984 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 209. 
 170. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1035.  
 171. Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *2, Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 
1032 (No. 83-491), 1983 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1064. 
 172. Id. at *2. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id.. 
 175. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1035–36. 
 176. Id. at 1040–41; see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484–87 (1963) 
(discussing the foundations of the exclusionary rule). 
 177. See, e.g., Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 571–72 (1987) (discussing the exclusion 
of derivative evidence); Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 694 (1982) (barring the admission 
of confession obtained from illegal arrest). 
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In a ruling that created the “illegal alien exception” to the exclusionary 
rule, the Supreme Court declined to suppress Lopez-Mendoza’s 
confession.178  The Court concluded that although the exclusionary rule 
might discourage police officers from engaging in misconduct, the same 
prophylactic rationale carried little force in civil deportation proceedings.179
Writing for the 5-4 majority, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor radically 
altered the target domain of the poisonous tree metaphor.  In contrast to 
criminal cases, in which pieces of evidence are viewed as tainted fruit that 
defile the courtroom, the metaphors of Lopez-Mendoza describe immigrants 
as tainted bodies that defile the nation.  As Justice O’Connor wrote: 
  
Beyond the legal significance of this holding, it is once again Lopez-
Mendoza’s metaphors that are most remarkable. 
Presumably no one would argue that the exclusionary rule should be 
invoked to prevent an agency from ordering corrective action at a leaking 
hazardous waste dump if the evidence underlying the order had been 
improperly obtained, or to compel police to return contraband explosives 
or drugs to their owner if the contraband had been unlawfully seized.180
Thus, unlike criminal defendants who are viewed as victims of illegally 
obtained evidence, Lopez-Mendoza presents immigrants as the objects of 
taint.  As Thomas Ross has observed:  “To see something as ‘defiled’ is to 
feel a special sense of the rightness, indeed the obligation, to cut it off, to 
exclude it, at whatever cost.”
 
181
Just as cleanup crews must do everything in their power to contain toxic 
waste and protect society, so too must the Supreme Court contain 
immigrants who would otherwise pollute the country.  The task before the 
Justices is imperative.  The illegal alien problem is like “contraband 
explosives” that could detonate at any time.
  Drugs destroy the body.  Hazardous waste 
pollutes the environment.  Lopez-Mendoza equates immigrants with these 
toxic items.  According to the Supreme Court’s metaphors, aliens are like 
poisonous agents that should be removed from the national body 
immediately. 
182
Organism metaphors describe the social community in terms of a 
physical body.
  If something is not done 
immediately, the alien bomb will blow up, destroying everything around it. 
183
 
 178. Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 55 FLA. L. 
REV. 391, 396–400 (2003) (surveying examples of “anti-egalitarianism in Fourth 
Amendment law”). 
  Mapping concepts of health and life onto concepts of 
country and society, Lopez-Mendoza’s organism metaphors describe the 
 179. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1044–46 (distinguishing between civil deportation 
proceedings and criminal trials). 
 180. Id. at 1046 (emphasis added). 
 181. See Ross, supra note 73, at 1068 (explaining how the poisonous tree metaphor 
connects readers to known realities). 
 182. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1046. 
 183. Gerald V. O’Brien, Indigestible Food, Conquering Hordes, and Waste Materials:  
Metaphors of Immigrants and the Early Immigration Restriction Debate in the United States, 
18 METAPHOR & SYMBOL 33, 35–38 (2003) (discussing the prevalence of organism 
metaphors in the immigration discourse of the early 1900s). 
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poisonous effects of immigration.184  Just as infectious diseases threaten 
our health, illegal aliens contaminate the social body.185  The associations 
created by these metaphors tie directly into our experiential understanding 
of the world.  We know that drugs endanger our well-being.  When foreign 
substances enter our bodies, our immune systems immediately attempt to 
combat them.  By comparing immigrants to drugs and toxic waste, Lopez-
Mendoza’s metaphors draw on the universal human desire to fend off 
internal contaminants.186
As in previous immigration stories, Lopez-Mendoza speaks of the 
“staggering dimension of the problem that the INS confronts.”
 
187  Unlike 
Plyler’s metaphors that describe the scale of immigration in terms of 
flooding, however, Lopez-Mendoza refers to the “massed numbers of 
ascertainably illegal aliens” in terms of national health.188
D.  Metaphors of Alienage, Floods, and Invasions 
  Lopez-Mendoza 
proposes to remove the pollution of illegal immigration from the United 
States by allowing courts to deport aliens with evidence obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.  Thus, organism metaphors empower 
judges to overlook constitutional violations in order to purge the nation of 
the contamination caused by illegal immigration. 
Consistent with the conceptual theory of metaphor, the foregoing 
immigration stories contain rich figurative language tied to our embodied 
understanding of the world.  Plyler contains numerous water metaphors that 
engage readers’ fear of drowning.  Hoffman employs metaphors of crime 
and attack that trigger self-defense instincts.  Lopez-Mendoza describes a 
national body polluted by immigrants.  These cases not only establish basic 
principles for the legal treatment of immigrants, they dictate how legal 
actors talk and think about noncitizens. 
Although these three stories are among the most important immigration 
decisions in the modern era, they are rather unexceptional in the prominent 
role metaphors play in their texts.  Here I explain how these stories join a 
much larger body of metaphors in the Supreme Court’s immigration 
jurisprudence.  By analyzing numerous metaphoric expressions in diverse 
legal contexts, three conceptual metaphors emerge:  IMMIGRANTS ARE 
ALIENS, IMMIGRATION IS A FLOOD, and IMMIGRATION IS AN INVASION. 
1.  Immigrants Are Aliens 
“Alien” is the most dominant metaphor in all of immigration law.  In 
fact, lawyers and judges refer to “aliens” so frequently that few would 
 
 184. See Musolff, supra note 38, at 25–26 (examining the pervasiveness of such 
mappings in political discourse). 
 185. See O’Brien, supra note 183, at 36 (arguing that modern societies adopt organism 
metaphors because of their focus on public health and disease prevention). 
 186. See Musolff, supra note 38, at 28 (discussing the relationship between the concepts 
of body, illness, and cure in Nazi rhetoric). 
 187. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1049 (emphasis added). 
 188. Id. at 1049–50 (emphasis added). 
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identify the word as a metaphor.  This reaction is understandable.  
Metaphors are traditionally viewed as simple comparisons between non-
literal concepts.  So, for example, statements such as “the flood of 
immigration” or “the immigrant invasion” are obvious metaphors because 
they describe immigration in terms of something that it is not—a body of 
water or an advancing army.  In contrast to such “strong” metaphors, the 
word “alien” appears to be definitional, rather than metaphoric.  The INA 
presents the term in this manner, defining “alien” as “any person not a 
citizen or national of the United States.”189
Despite this benign appearance, however, several metaphoric references 
lie just beneath the surface.  Here I employ the conceptual definition of 
metaphor, rather than the traditional linguistic definition that involves an “A 
is a B” format.
  Stated mildly in the statutory 
context, “alien” seems to be a neutral word that means simply “noncitizen.”  
As such, the INA presents “alien” in profoundly unmetaphoric terms. 
190  The theory of experientialism holds that human beings 
formulate knowledge by drawing metaphoric associations between abstract 
concepts and more meaningful concepts.191  As bridges between the 
familiar and unfamiliar, metaphors serve as critical tools for understanding 
the world.192
Words cannot be divorced from their culturally grounded meanings.  
When legal actors speak of “aliens,” a series of qualities comes to mind 
about the target group:  aliens are nonhuman; aliens are illegal border-
crossers; and aliens are Mexicans.  Those who doubt the metaphoric nature 
of “alien” and reduce its meaning to simple statutory or definitional terms 
assume a level of mutual exclusivity in language that does not exist.  
“Alien” is both a metaphor and a statutory term.  In addition to defining 
immigrants as noncitizens in the INA, “alien” conveys three distinct 
qualities:  otherness, illegality, and ethnicity.  The following sections 
consider each of these metaphoric associations in turn. 
  In this way, “alien” is the central metaphor of immigration 
law because it relies on a wide body of experiential knowledge—social, 
cultural, and historical—to create meaning.  The term is a metaphor not 
because it involves a comparison between concepts—as the linguist 
definition of metaphor holds—but because it serves as the primary vehicle 
for mapping culturally embedded references onto the legal identity of 
immigrants. 
 
 189. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2006); see also Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration 
Laws, supra note 24, at 272 (describing “the blandness of the definition”). 
 190. See Rakova, supra note 64, at 217 (noting that the experientialist account challenges 
the older definition of metaphor as a means of expressing similarity between concepts); see 
also Calvert, supra note 36, at 547 (describing the traditional definition of metaphor). 
 191. See Rakova, supra note 64, at 216 (discussing the breadth and attractiveness of 
experiential theory). 
 192. Petrie & Oshlag, supra note 54, at 589 (explaining how metaphors allow for the 
transfer of meanings). 
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a.  Alien Is Other 
The etymology of “alien” informs the modern use of the word.  The 
English definition of “alien” derives from the Old French word allien, 
which means “strange, foreign,” and the Latin words alienus and alius, 
which mean “of or belonging to another person or place,” “hostile,” 
“strange,” and “other.”193
The contemporary definition of “alien,” reflects its origins: 
  Thus, according to early definitions, aliens are 
dangerous others who are marked by their strangeness. 
A. adj. 1. gen.  Belonging to another person, place, or family; strange, 
foreign, not of one’s own . . . . 
B. n. 1.a.  A person belonging to another family, race, or nation; a 
stranger, a foreigner.194
From these definitions, American immigration law was born.  Under the 
Naturalization Act of 1790 only “free white person[s]” could naturalize 
(i.e., escape from the unnatural state of alienage).
 
195  The Alien and 
Sedition Acts of 1798 allowed the president to remove aliens “judge[d] 
dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States.”196  Multiple states 
enacted Alien Land Laws in the early 1900s out of fear of competition from 
aliens.197  The Alien Registration Act of 1940 expanded the grounds for 
deporting immigrants engaged in subversive activities.198
The same dehumanizing associations presented in the statutory context 
(i.e., strangeness, hostility, and otherness) appear in contemporary judicial 
decisions as well.  Several variations of the Supreme Court’s alien 
metaphors emphasize the nonhuman qualities of immigrants: 
  All of this alien-
specific legislation reflected a conceptual understanding of aliens that 
matched the word’s etymology.  Because aliens were defined as “hostile” 
and “strange,” early legislatures enacted laws to protect citizens from the 
other-worldly threat depicted by these metaphoric representations. 
 
 193. 1 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 314–15 (2d ed. 1989); WALTER W. SKEAT, AN 
ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 13 (1968); see also ONLINE 
ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, Alien, http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=alien. 
 194. 1 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 314–15 (2d ed. 1989). 
 195. Naturalization Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, 104, repealed by Act of Jan. 
29, 1795, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414. 
 196. Alien Friends Act, ch. 58, § 1, 1 Stat. 570, 570–71 (1798); HIROSHI MOTOMURA, 
AMERICANS IN WAITING:  THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED 
STATES 18–19 (2006) (discussing the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798). 
 197. See ALEJANDRO PORTES & RUBÉN G. RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA:  A PORTRAIT 
38–40 (3d. ed. 2006) (explaining the effects of Alien Land Laws on immigrant 
communities); Dudley O. McGovney, The Anti-Japanese Land Laws of California and Ten 
Other States, 35 CAL. L. REV. 7 (1947) (discussing differences between various Alien Land 
Laws). 
 198. See ROGER DANIELS, GUARDING THE GOLDEN DOOR:  AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 
POLICY AND IMMIGRANTS SINCE 1882, at 83 (2004) (explaining the political and substantive 
effects of the Alien Registration Act). 
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[T]he alien must first either surrender to the INS for deportation or wait 
for the INS to catch him and commence a deportation proceeding . . . .199
[T]he Government may continue to detain an alien who still remains here 
or release that alien under supervision.
 
200
Routine checkpoint inquiries apprehend many smugglers and illegal 
aliens who succumb to the lure of such highways.  And the prospect of 
such inquiries [slows] their movement and [makes] them more vulnerable 
to detection by roving patrols.
 
201
Thus, in certain instances, the Supreme Court employs dehumanizing 
metaphors to describe aliens as animals that are caught and released.  In 
other Court opinions, dehumanization occurs by describing aliens as 
creatures from outer space.  Extraterrestrials are the ultimate nonhumans.  
Recognizing the ability of “alien” to convey foreignness, science fiction 
writers co-opted the word in the mid-twentieth century.
 
202
[T]he relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has 
been committed to the political branches of the Federal Government.
  Born in a 
foreign galaxy, space creatures do not eat our food or breathe our air; they 
possess fewer human qualities than even animals on Earth.  At times, the 
Court has described immigrants in this way: 
203
Empirical data discussed in detail below show that “alien” and “illegal 
alien” are by far the most common terms used to refer to immigrants in the 
law.
 
204  Because metaphors connect listeners to deeply embedded cultural 
knowledge, the repeated use of “alien” in legal texts unavoidably triggers 
readers’ inclinations to associate aliens with extraterrestrials.  For example, 
the Court frequently employs the metaphor ALIENS ARE INVADERS to 
discuss immigration.205  According to popular science fiction narratives, 
extraterrestrials seek to dominate the universe.206
 
 199. Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 55 (1993) (emphasis added). 
  As a method for creating 
multiple, overlapping correspondences, the invasion metaphor relates 
simultaneously to popular images of space creatures attempting to overtake 
the galaxy, as well as more conventional notions of warfare.  By connecting 
readers to this cultural imagery, the Court’s alien metaphors present 
 200. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 683 (2001) (emphasis added) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 201. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 471 n.15 (1990) (emphasis added). 
 202. See 1 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 314–15 (2d ed. 1989); see also Leighton B. 
Cooke, The Human Alien:  In-Groups and Outbreeding in Enemy Mine, in ALIENS:  THE 
ANTHROPOLOGY OF SCIENCE FICTION 179, 181 (George E. Slusser & Eric S. Rabkin eds., 
1987) (explaining how popular science fiction stories often express xenophobic attitudes). 
 203. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) (emphasis added). 
 204. See infra Part II.D.1.b and accompanying Figures 1 and 2 (presenting empirical data 
on alien terminology in federal court opinions). 
 205. See infra Part II.D.3 (examining different permutations of invasion metaphors in 
Supreme Court opinions). 
 206. STEPHANIE CARVIN & STUART JILL, SCIENCE FICTION OR SCIENCE FANTASY?  THE 
GENDERED PORTRAYAL OF ALIENS AND THE DISCOURSE OF DOMINANCE IN OUTER SPACE 3, 
presented at the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Chicago, Ill. 
(Feb. 28, 2007) (discussing stories of invasion contained in science fiction accounts). 
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immigrants not only as invaders from foreign countries, but also as 
nonhuman aggressors from foreign worlds. 
Metaphors can dehumanize through direct comparisons to nonhumans, 
such as animals or space creatures, or by refusing to ascribe human qualities 
to immigrants.207
[T]he general purpose of the immigration statute’s employment 
prohibition is to diminish the attractive force of employment, which like a 
magnet pulls illegal immigrants toward the United States . . . .
  Such attribute-based metaphors dehumanize immigrants 
by presenting aliens as inanimate objects that are transported and pulled by 
outside forces: 
208
[M]any Mexicans being imported into this country . . . .
 
209
[Respondent] and respondent[’s] wife paid a professional smuggler $450 
to transport them into this country . . . .
 
210
[S]he had attempted to smuggle aliens for gain.
 
211
As nonhuman things, aliens can be pulled, smuggled, or transported, 
much like boxes of books or cases of wine.  The law does not extend 
personal rights to such goods.  According to these metaphors, aliens should 
be controlled and regulated in the same manner as other articles of 
commerce. 
 
Another form of attribute-based dehumanization in Supreme Court texts 
presents aliens as dangerous diseases.  Much like Lopez-Mendoza’s 
reference to aliens as hazardous waste and drugs, these organism metaphors 
describe immigrants as health risks: 
Illegal aliens pose a potential health hazard to the community since many 
seek work as nursemaids, food handlers, cooks, housekeepers, waiters, 
dishwashers, and grocery workers.212
Congress recognized that the influx of foreign infectious diseases, mass 
immigration coupled with poor housing and sanitation, hunger, and 
malnutrition had taken their toll.
 
213
[T]he flow of traffic tends to be too heavy to allow the particularized 
study of a given car that would enable it to be identified as a possible 
carrier of illegal aliens.
 
214
 
 207. See Steve Loughnan et al., Understanding the Relationship Between Attribute-Based 
and Metaphor-Based Dehumanization, 12 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 747, 747–
49 (2009) (examining different methods of dehumanization). 
 
 208. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 155 (2002) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). 
 209. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 902 (1975) (Burger, C.J., 
concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398 (S.D. Cal. 
1973)). 
 210. INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 446 (1985) (emphasis added). 
 211. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 30 (1982) (emphasis added). 
 212. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 903 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Baca, 368 F. Supp. at 398). 
 213. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 532 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis 
added). 
 214. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557 (1976) (emphasis added). 
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Much as diseases enter the body, aliens enter the country and quickly 
spread throughout communities.  Through attribute-based dehumanizing 
metaphors, the Supreme Court presents illegal immigration as a form of 
public health emergency that justifies aggressive containment measures.215
According to the conceptual theory of metaphor, the process of mapping 
qualities from source domains onto target domains is always partial and 
incomplete.
 
216
b.  Alien Is Illegal 
  The aspects of each domain obscured by a particular 
metaphor remain a crucial (yet concealed) function of this mapping process.  
By presenting immigrants as animals, diseases, and inanimate objects, the 
metaphor IMMIGRANTS ARE ALIENS conceals immigrants’ personhood and 
potential for social contribution.  The metaphor brings focus to images of 
foreignness and otherness, producing a narrowly focused picture of 
nonhumans who can never belong. 
The metaphoric image of illegal aliens is omnipresent in law.  To 
demonstrate the metaphoric association between immigrants and illegality, 
this Article presents original empirical data on alienage terminology in legal 
opinions.  The data derives from post-1965 federal court decisions that 
contain any combination of three adjectives (“illegal,” “undocumented,” 
and “unauthorized”) and three nouns (“immigrant,” “alien,” and 
“noncitizen”).217
 
 215. See O’Brien, supra note 
  The study produced 4200 instances of separate adjective-
noun combinations.  As Figure 1 indicates, “illegal alien” was by far the 
most common term, appearing in 69% of opinions (2905 cases).  No other 
term appeared in more than 10% of opinions, except “undocumented alien,” 
which accounted for 16% of the results in 670 cases.  Distinguishing 
between the nouns “alien,” “immigrant,” and “noncitizen” in the data set, 
judges used “alien” in 88% of opinions (3706 cases), while “immigrant” 
appeared in only 12% of opinions (494 cases). 
13, at 36 (examining metaphors that involve harm to 
national health). 
 216. See Thomas W. Joo, Contract, Property, and the Role of Metaphor in Corporations 
Law, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 779, 782–83 (2002) (describing metaphor as a complex 
mapping process). 
 217. These data were generated from a textual search on Westlaw conducted on January 
6, 2010.  The search consisted of all federal court opinions that appeared in the following 
Westlaw databases:  All U.S. Supreme Court Cases (SCT), Reported U.S. Court of Appeals 
Cases (CTAR), and Reported U.S. District Court Cases (DCTR).  The search contained the 
singular and plural versions of the following terms:  “illegal alien,” “undocumented alien,” 
“unauthorized alien,” “illegal immigrant,” “undocumented immigrant,” “unauthorized 
immigrant,” “illegal noncitizen,” “undocumented noncitizen,” and “unauthorized 
noncitizen.”  Opinions that contained more than one search term (e.g., both “illegal alien” 
and “undocumented immigrant”) were counted as separate instances in the data set.  Multiple 
appearances of the same term within an opinion, as well as plural and singular versions of 
the same term within an opinion, were counted as one instance in the data set. 
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Figure 1:  Data on “Illegal Alien” in Federal Cases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The prevalence of “illegal alien” in legal opinions is extraordinary given 
that the law provides no clear definition of the term.218  Although “illegal 
alien” is often used to refer to people who overstay their visas or enter the 
country without inspection, there are several scenarios in which these 
immigrants may remain lawfully in the United States.  For example, many 
of the people described as “illegal aliens” have family connections, 
community ties, or legitimate fears of persecution that entitle them to 
discretionary relief.219  But when courts use “illegal alien” as a descriptive 
term, these rights have rarely been adjudicated.  As Beth Lyon has noted, 
referring to such people as “illegal aliens” is equivalent to referring to 
defendants awaiting trial as “convicted criminals.”220
 
 218. See Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration Laws, supra note 
  Although lay 
audiences may not grasp this distinction, federal judges should. 
24, at 276; Karl 
Manheim, State Immigration Laws and Federal Supremacy, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 939, 
949 n.61 (1995) (describing “illegal alien” as a term “unknown to federal immigration law”); 
Neuman, supra note 24, at 1440–41 (arguing that the catch-all phrase “illegal alien” fails to 
account for the variable contexts of unauthorized immigration). 
 219. See Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration Laws, supra note 24, at 276–78; 
Neuman, supra note 24, at 1440–41 (describing situations in which unauthorized immigrants 
may assert valid claims to remain in the United States). 
 220. Beth Lyon, When More “Security” Equals Less Workplace Safety:  Reconsidering 
U.S. Laws that Disadvantage Unauthorized Workers, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 571, 576 
(2004). 
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Even Supreme Court Justices overlook basic notions of due process when 
describing “illegal aliens.”  For instance, in Lopez-Mendoza, the Supreme 
Court wrote:  “The constable’s blunder may allow the criminal to go free, 
but we have never suggested that it allows the criminal to continue in the 
commission of an ongoing crime.”221  Remarkably, the Court conceded that 
the person described in the above passage as a “criminal” had never been 
convicted of any crime.222
Figure 2:  Data on “Alien” in Federal Cases 
  Because the immigrant in Lopez-Mendoza was 
an “alien,” however, the Justices simply presumed that he had engaged in 
criminal wrongdoing even though no court had ruled as such. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition to ignoring the nuanced nature of immigration status, the 
illegal alien metaphor distorts the severity of an immigrant’s offense.  For 
example, entering the country without inspection (i.e., crossing the border 
illegally) is a first-time misdemeanor that federal officials rarely 
prosecute.223  Further, nearly half of all people described as “illegal aliens” 
obtained their “illegal” status by overstaying valid visas—a civil 
immigration violation that involves no criminal conduct whatsoever.224
 
 221. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1047 (1984) (emphasis added). 
  
 222. Id. at 1047 n.3; see also In re Sandoval-Sanchez, No. A22 346 925, 168 (INS Oct. 7, 
1977) (“There is nothing in the record to show that he has any criminal record.”). 
 223. 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2006); Lenni B. Benson, By Hook or by Crook:  Exploring the 
Legality of an INS Sting Operation, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 813, 823 n.39 (1994) (discussing 
criminal prosecutions of immigration-related crimes). 
 224. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) (2006); Stephen H. Legomsky, Portraits of the 
Undocumented Immigrant: A Dialogue, 44 GA. L. REV. 65, 143-44 (2009); see also 
Manheim, supra note 218, at 949 n.61 (noting that many people described as “illegal aliens” 
have committed only civil immigration violations). 
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Nevertheless, the language of alienage equates these misdemeanors and 
non-criminal acts with serious crimes: 
[T]he minivan was registered to an address . . . north of the border in an 
area notorious for alien and narcotics smuggling.225
[I]t seems that the Immigration and Naturalization Service is powerless to 
stop the tide of illegal aliens—and dangerous drugs—that daily and 
freely crosses our 2,000-mile southern boundary.
 
226
If “illegal” means “criminal” and “alien” means “stranger,” then through 
the illegal alien metaphor, immigrants become criminal strangers.  As 
such, the illegal alien metaphor presents immigrants as more than mere 
border-crossers; like murderers, robbers, and drug dealers, they threaten the 
social order. 
 
Once understood as “illegal aliens,” immigrants garner little sympathy 
from a public accustomed to punishing its convicts.  A society that 
constantly seeks to separate the “wicked” from the “righteous” relies on the 
sorting function provided by the illegal frame.227  If a crime has been 
committed, then arrests must be made, convictions obtained, and penalties 
assessed.228
The conflation of source and target domains encouraged by the illegal 
alien metaphor fuels a growing public distrust of both authorized and 
unauthorized immigrants.
 
229  Based on the popular misconception that most 
immigrants lack legal status, over fifty percent of Americans want to reduce 
all levels of immigration, legal and illegal.230  As a proxy for criminality 
and immigration in general, the illegal alien metaphor fosters 
misunderstandings about the scope of illegal immigration and the 
appropriate responses to the perceived problem.231
 
 225. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 271 (2002) (emphasis added). 
 
 226. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 899, 899 (1975) (Burger, C.J., 
concurring) (emphasis added). 
 227. See Duncan, supra note 90, at 793 (discussing images of “criminal contamination” in 
American law). 
 228. See Johnson, supra note 66, at 868 (describing social responses to metaphorical 
frames involving crime). 
 229. See Knud S. Larsen et al., Threat Perception and Attitudes Toward Documented and 
Undocumented Immigrants in the United States:  Framing the Debate and Conflict 
Resolution, 7 EUR. J. SOC. SCI. 115, 116 (2009) (examining public fears of authorized and 
unauthorized immigrants). 
 230. Deenesh Sohoni, The ‘Immigrant Problem’:  Modern-Day Nativism on the Web, 54 
CURRENT SOC. 827, 829 (2006) (discussing social attitudes toward immigrants).  Roughly 
two-thirds of immigrants reside legally in the United States. Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera 
Cohn, Pew Hispanic Ctr.:  Trends in Unauthorized Immigration, Undocumented Inflow Now 
Trails Legal Inflow ii (2008), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/94.pdf; see 
also Capps, supra note 88, at 170 (estimating that at least thirty percent of immigrants lack 
legal status). 
 231. See MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS:  ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF 
MODERN AMERICA 2–3 (2004) (arguing that the presence of a large number of unauthorized 
immigrants within Asian and Latino communities creates a perception that members of those 
communities are illegitimate). 
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According to cognitive linguists, metaphors are more likely to mislead 
listeners when they are repeated and accepted without evaluation.232  As 
George Lakoff, the pioneer of conceptual metaphor theory, states, “The 
things most alive in our conceptual system are those things that we use 
constantly, unconsciously, and automatically.”233
c.  Alien Is Mexican 
  But metaphors that 
appear “dead” are in fact very much alive in our minds, silently influencing 
our perceptions of people and concepts.  Illegal alien is one such metaphor.  
Through constant, uncritical repetition, the illegal alien metaphor has 
transformed immigrants into a monolithic group of criminal strangers who 
must be captured, convicted, and expelled. 
The immigration laws of the United States have been marred by a long 
history of racist restrictions.234  From Chinese exclusion, to bans on 
“undesirable races” from Europe, to a host of other racial and ethnic 
barriers, immigration laws during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
exhibited an undeniable preoccupation with race.235
Although “illegal alien” could theoretically refer to any group of 
immigrants, the term has a much tighter racial focus.  In contemporary legal 
discourse, references to “illegal aliens” facilitate a coded discussion on 
immigration that—rather than involving immigrants in general—focuses on 
Mexicans in particular
  Much like the 
explicitly racist language of the past, today’s illegal alien remains a highly 
racialized figure. 
236
 
 232. See Winter, The Metaphor of Standing, supra note 79, at 1382 (warning against the 
uncritical use of metaphors). 
: 
 233. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK TURNER, MORE THAN COOL REASON:  A FIELD GUIDE TO 
POETIC METAPHOR 62 (1989). 
 234. See generally DAVID BACON, ILLEGAL PEOPLE:  HOW GLOBALIZATION CREATES 
MIGRATION AND CRIMINALIZES IMMIGRANTS 205–07 (2008) (summarizing race-based 
exclusions in early immigration laws); Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Citizenship Paradox in a 
Transnational Age, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1111, 1114 (2008) (discussing the ideology of Anglo-
Saxon superiority embedded in the Supreme Court’s early immigration decisions). 
 235. See MOTOMURA, supra note 196, at 121–32 (summarizing the history of racial 
restrictions in immigration law); NGAI, supra note 231, at 17–55 (examining the racial 
restrictions embedded in American immigration law and policy from 1924 to 1965); Kevin 
R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration:  The Intersection of Immigration Status, 
Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509, 1543 (1995) (discussing immigration 
status and ethnicity); Ediberto Román, The Alien Invasion?, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 841, 872–81 
(2008) (discussing the racial effects of immigration laws during the twentieth century). 
 236. See NGAI, supra note 231, at 2–3, 264 (discussing the close relationship between 
illegal status and race); Neuman, supra note 24, at 1429 n.17 (examining the role race played 
in early immigration restrictions); Frank H. Wu, The Limits of Borders:  A Moderate 
Proposal for Immigration Reform, 7 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 35, 36–37 (1996) (examining 
the race-based objectives of pre-1965 immigration policies); see also KENT A. ONO & JOHN 
M. SLOOP, SHIFTING BORDERS:  RHETORIC, IMMIGRATION, AND CALIFORNIA’S PROPOSITION 
187, at 40 (2002) (discussing popular media images of a “generalized brown figure 
encroaching from the south”). 
1578 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
The net effect of this silent invasion of illegal aliens from Mexico is 
suffering by the aliens . . . .237
These local problems are particularly acute in California in light of the 
significant influx . . . of illegal aliens from neighboring Mexico.
 
238
Like metaphors of criminality that distort the nature of an immigrant’s 
wrongdoing, the illegal alien metaphor suggests that the unauthorized 
immigrant population is entirely composed of Mexican residents.  But this 
is simply not the case.  For example, the two Supreme Court passages listed 
above were written in the mid-1970s, at a time when nearly half of 
unauthorized immigrants came from countries other than Mexico.
 
239
Access from Mexico into this country, across our 2,000-mile border, is 
readily available and virtually uncontrollable.
  
Although immigration from Mexico represented a substantial proportion of 
the unauthorized population, the “invasion” from Mexico described in those 
passages simply did not exist.  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has 
employed the illegal alien frame to describe a massive number of aliens 
approaching from the south: 
240
[T]he colossal problem presented by illegal entries from Mexico.
 
241
Although the number of unauthorized Mexican immigrants has increased 
substantially in recent decades,
 
242
Citizens and immigrants alike are affected by the racial and ethnic 
implications of the illegal alien frame.  Just as the alien metaphor merges 
every immigrant category into one, thereby raising public opposition to all 
forms of immigration, the illegal alien metaphor merges all Latino residents 
into one group of unauthorized outsiders.  Historian Mae Ngai describes 
“alien citizenship” as the concept of existing as a foreigner in one’s own 
country.
 thus making the metaphor’s associations 
more “accurate,” the illegal alien metaphor has never been concerned with 
conveying a true picture of real demographics. 
243  Thus, although they reside legally in the United States, 
naturalized citizens remain presumptive foreigners within American society 
because of the immutability of their alien citizenship status.244
 
 237. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 904 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added) 
(quoting United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398 (S.D. Cal. 1973)). 
  By 
transferring qualities of criminality and otherness to residents based on 
 238. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976) (emphasis added). 
 239. Robert Warren & Jeffrey S. Passel, A Count of the Uncountable:  Estimates of 
Undocumented Aliens Counted in the 1980 United States Census, 24 DEMOGRAPHY 375, 380 
(1987) (estimating that from 1960 to 1975, 1,116,000 people immigrated to the United States 
illegally, 571,000 (51%) of whom were from Mexico). 
 240. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 237 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 241. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 864 n.5 (1982) (emphasis added). 
 242. In 2008, 7 million unauthorized immigrants from Mexico resided in the United 
States, as compared to 4.9 million unauthorized immigrants from other countries. Passel & 
Cohn, supra note 230, at 3–5. 
 243. NGAI, supra note 231, at 8 (arguing that the experience of Asian and Latino 
immigrants should be understood within the context of exclusionary racial quotas and 
colonialism). 
 244. Id. at 2. 
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ethnicity, the illegal alien metaphor brands Latino residents as 
unassimilable foreigners who remain ineligible to attain full membership in 
society, regardless of their legal status.245
The Supreme Court established a direct link between “alien” and 
“Mexican” in Rosales-Lopez v. United States.
 
246  That case involved a 
criminal defendant charged with “smuggling” people into the United States 
from Mexico.247  The defense sought to ask prospective jurors about any 
personal biases they held against Mexican immigrants.248  The presiding 
judge disallowed the question, instead asking:  “Do any of you have any 
feelings about the alien problem at all?”249  On review, the Supreme Court 
held that asking about “the alien problem” was equivalent to asking about 
Mexican immigration.250
American society no longer sanctions racist language in legal discourse.  
Because “illegal alien” is facially ambiguous, however, the term enables 
speakers to express racialized concerns in a race-neutral way.
  According to the Supreme Court, because “alien” 
meant “Mexican,” the presiding judge did not have to utter the word 
“Mexican” in order for the jury to comprehend the reference.  In other 
words, because every juror understood that the “alien problem” was the 
“Mexican problem,” no further inquiry was necessary.  This association 
was possible only because of the racial code provided by the illegal alien 
metaphor. 
251  Society 
will accept Supreme Court Justices who are “anti-crime” or “anti-illegal 
immigration,” but will reject those Justices viewed as “anti-Mexican.”252  
As such, the code provided by the illegal alien metaphor enables a silent 
transfer of meaning without the social sanction that would otherwise 
accompany more overt language.253
As discussed above, conceptual metaphors are most likely to conflate 
subject and target domains when describing people and social 
movements.
 
254  No longer seen as figurative, the metaphor becomes 
mistaken for a semi-literal representation of a target group.255
 
 245. See Leti Volpp, The Culture of Citizenship, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 571, 575–
77 (2007) (criticizing the view of immigrants as “racialized others overburdened with 
culture”). 
  The illegal 
 246. 451 U.S. 182 (1981). 
 247. Id. at 184–85 (emphasis added). 
 248. Id. at 185. 
 249. Id. at 185–88 (emphasis added). 
 250. Id. at 193 (“There can be no doubt that the jurors would have understood a question 
about aliens to at least include Mexican aliens.”). 
 251. See generally Phyllis Pease Chock, Ambiguity in Policy Discourse:  Congressional 
Talk About Immigration, 28 POL’Y SCI. 165 (1995) (examining the racial codes of 
immigration rhetoric). 
 252. Robert Short & Lisa Magana, Political Rhetoric, Immigration Attitudes, and 
Contemporary Prejudice:  A Mexican American Dilemma, 142 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 701, 702–
03 (2002) (arguing that anti-immigrant labels avoid the psychological burdens associated 
with explicitly racist discourse). 
 253. See O’Brien, supra note 183, at 44 (explaining how inhumane social policies often 
follow dehumanizing rhetoric). 
 254. See supra Part I (examining personal and doctrinal metaphors). 
 255. Duncan, supra note 90, at 795. 
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alien metaphor achieves this end by transferring meaning from alien to 
criminal to Mexican.256  These associations are difficult to recognize, 
however, because their definitions derive from unspoken racial codes.  
What emerges in legal texts is an essentialized understanding of immigrants 
as dangerous things that are infused with ethnicity.257
2.  Immigration Is a Flood 
  Just as the root word 
alienus means “hostile” or “other,” the term “illegal alien” presents 
immigrants as racialized outsiders who are unable to contribute to a 
common social endeavor. 
Conceptual metaphors often describe social changes in terms of moving 
objects.258  According to these metaphors, just as we cannot control the 
speed or direction of some physical forces, we cannot control changes in 
our lives and communities.259  For example, some people might say that the 
country is “sliding into disaster”260
The metaphor IMMIGRATION IS A FLOOD involves three distinct 
characteristics of immigration:  direction, size, and force.  With regard to 
direction, the Supreme Court’s metaphors depict a northward immigrant 
stream: 
 or “the winds of change are blowing.”  
The Supreme Court frequently frames immigration in this way, describing 
the movement of people across borders as an uncontrollable body of water 
that harms the nation. 
[T]he “formidable law enforcement problems” posed by the northbound 
tide of illegal entrants into the United States.261
[S]temming the flow of illegal aliens along the Mexican-American 
border . . . .
 
262
These metaphors suggest that most immigrants flow into the United 
States without first obtaining authorization at the border.  Once again, 
immigration demographics do not bear out the metaphor’s implications.  
Forty-five percent of unauthorized immigrants living in the United States 
entered the country legally;
 
263
 
 256. See Lisa A. Flores, Constructing Rhetorical Borders:  Peons, Illegal Aliens, and 
Competing Narratives of Immigration, 20 CRITICAL STUD. MEDIA COMM. 362, 363 (2003) 
(discussing metaphors of immigration and criminality). 
 they did not gush into the country as the 
 257. See Joo, supra note 216, at 799 (noting that the “essentialized part” of a domain may 
appear to represent the whole). 
 258. KÖVECSES, supra note 25, at 136 (examining the conceptual metaphor “changes are 
movements”). 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (emphasis added) (quoting 
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 551–54 (1976)). 
 262. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 899, 902 (1975) (Burger, C.J., 
concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398 (S.D. Cal. 
1973)). 
 263. PEW HISPANIC CTR., MODES OF ENTRY FOR THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT 
POPULATION 1 (2006), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/19.pdf (estimating 
that up to forty-five percent of unauthorized immigrants enter the country on a valid visa but 
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flood metaphor suggests, but instead came to the country on valid visas that 
later expired.  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court describes unauthorized 
immigrants as a monolithic group of border-crossers that approaches from 
Mexico in an overwhelming fashion: 
[T]he presence of large numbers of undocumented aliens in this country 
creates law enforcement problems of titanic proportions.264
[T]he vast tide of illegal immigration that had produced a shadow 
population of literally millions of undocumented aliens in the United 
States.
 
265
With . . . the facilities at Guantanamo and available Coast Guard cutters 
saturated, . . . the Government could no longer . . . protect our 
borders . . . .
 
266
The Court’s many references to massive flows
 
267 and influxes268
The entire system, however, has been notably unsuccessful in deterring or 
stemming this heavy flow; and its costs, including added burdens on the 
courts, have been substantial.
 are too 
numerous to list.  Just as levies attempt to hold back large bodies of water, 
the border is presented as a fragile dike that might burst at any moment, 
given the pressure coming from the alien flood: 
269
[T]he flow of illegal aliens cannot be controlled effectively at the 
border.
 
270
The unrestrained immigrant flood portends dangerous social change.
 
271  
The immigrant waves described in Supreme Court opinions appear as 
foreboding bodies that submerge everything in their path, including 
American culture.  As Justice Rehnquist wrote, aliens are not like 
naturalized citizens who have adjusted “to our patterns of living and 
attitudes, and have demonstrated a basic understanding of our institutions, 
system of government, history, and traditions.”272
 
overstay or otherwise violate a condition of entry); see also Johnson, supra note 
  Instead, as Justice Lewis 
235, at 1546 
(discussing misperceptions about the number of illegal border-crossers residing in the United 
States). 
 264. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 239 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added). 
 265. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 481 (1991) (emphasis added) 
(internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 266. Sale v. Haitian Ctr. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 163 (1993) (emphasis added). 
 267. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 296 (1993) (emphasis added) (describing the 
“increased flow of unaccompanied juvenile aliens into California”). 
 268. See, e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 849 (1985) (emphasis added) (discussing 
attempts to control the “influx of undocumented aliens”); United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal 
458 U.S. 858, 876 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (discussing the 
“tremendous influx of illegal aliens”). 
 269. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 915 (1975) (White, J., concurring) (emphasis 
added). 
 270. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976) (emphasis added). 
 271. See Jonathan Charteris-Black, Britain as a Container:  Immigration Metaphors in 
the 2005 Election Campaign, 17 DISCOURSE & SOC’Y 563, 572–73 (2006) (discussing water 
metaphors in political discourse). 
 272. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 662 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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Powell said, aliens bring “significant economic and social problems” with 
them.273  Water is supposed to cleanse and give life.274  But the immigrant 
surge in Supreme Court opinions is a brown tide that immerses the 
American way of life.275
According to cognitive linguists, much of human reasoning derives from 
basic physical and social interactions.
 
276  Floods constitute a core 
component of this embodied knowledge.  Great floods have devastated 
societies throughout human history.  In addition, people possess a keen 
sense of rivers and tides based on their knowledge of the physical world.277
Although they would like to right our national ship before it capsizes, the 
Justices are nihilistic in their figurative accounts of immigration, describing 
a nation saturated by an uncontrolled flow of aliens.
  
Drawing on these associations, the Supreme Court’s water metaphors 
emphasize the dangers of a growing immigrant population. 
278
3.  Immigration Is an Invasion 
  According to the 
Court’s water metaphors, the immigrant wave is too massive and the federal 
government is too inept for citizens to hold back the alien surge. 
Human beings instinctively fear outside physical threats.  Throughout 
recorded history, nations have built walls and raised armies in response to 
real and perceived enemies.  There are few, if any, aspects of our embodied 
experience more central than self-defense. 
Drawing on this social, historical, and cultural knowledge, we often 
explain foreign concepts in terms of battle.  Consider the following 
conceptual metaphors and their linguistic tokens:  POLITICS IS WAR279 (“The 
fight erupted over abortion”),280 ARGUMENT IS WAR (“I couldn’t defend that 
point”),281 and SPORT IS WAR (“My team did not use the right strategy”).282
 
 273. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975). 
  
Reflecting the centrality of war metaphors in human thought, the Supreme 
Court often describes immigration in terms of invasion. 
 274. See Duncan, supra note 90, at 749 (explaining how the image of water plays a 
central role in metaphors of crime control). 
 275. See generally OTTO SANTA ANA, BROWN TIDE RISING:  METAPHORS OF LATINOS IN 
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PUBLIC DISCOURSE 65–155 (2002) (analyzing the use of water 
metaphors in recent immigration debates in California); Santa Ana et al., supra note 51, at 
152–53 (arguing that water metaphors mask the individuality and humanity of immigrants). 
 276. Winter, supra note 26, at 1130–31. 
 277. Charteris-Black, supra note 271, at 570–71 (arguing that water metaphors often 
describe an increase in the rate of immigration). 
 278. Santa Ana et al., supra note 51, at 154–56 (explaining how water metaphors portray 
the nation as a sinking boat). 
 279. KÖVECSES, supra note 25, at 22, 62, 94. 
 280. Id. at 22. 
 281. Id. at 80. 
 282. Id. at 75. 
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Mirroring popular media accounts of an “alien invasion,”283 the Supreme 
Court’s metaphoric wars present immigrants as aggressors who threaten 
national sovereignty284
Congress [is] vested by the Constitution with the responsibility of 
protecting our borders.
: 
285
[W]e leave no unprotected spot in the Nation’s armor.
 
286
The deployment of border patrol agents along the border . . . 
maximize[s] . . . personnel, with the first line of defense being called the 
“line watch.”
 
287
At times the Supreme Court’s war metaphors depict aliens engaged in 
direct conflict.  At other times, however, the intruders approach silently: 
 
[T]he evasion of the federal regulatory program that is the mark of 
undocumented status . . . .288
[I]llegal entrants from Mexico pose[] formidable law enforcement 
problems.  The principal problem arises from surreptitious entries.
 
289
Through these metaphors, immigrants appear as guerrilla warriors who 
hide and wait to attack.  The battles in the Court’s metaphoric wars will 
cease only when the foreign invaders surrender: 
 
In attempting to protect California’s fiscal interests . . . from the 
deleterious effects on its economy . . . [the statute] . . . is tailored to 
combat effectively the perceived evils.290
[M]ost aliens . . . can ensure themselves review in courts of appeals only 
if they voluntarily surrender themselves for deportation.
 
291
In addition to depicting conventional and guerilla warfare, the Court also 
employs metaphors that describe a more exotic attack involving female 
immigrants overtaking the nation through reproduction.  These fertility 
metaphors depict unauthorized immigrant women as people who wish to 
conquer the United States by bearing American citizens: 
 
[D]eportation by aliens creative and fertile enough to continuously 
produce new and material facts . . . .292
 
 283. See generally Román, supra note 
 
235, at 843–55 (challenging media descriptions of 
an “alien invasion”). 
 284. See Leo R. Chávez, Public Discourse, Immigration, and Control of the U.S.-Mexico 
Border:  Reflections on Jorge Durand and Douglas S. Massey’s “The Costs of 
Contradiction:  US Border Policy 1986–2000”, 1 LATINO STUD. 253, 255 (2003) (discussing 
media depictions of immigrants as hostile invaders). 
 285. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 237 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added); 
see also Michigan v. Summers 452 U.S. 692, 699 (1981) (emphasis added) (describing the 
“difficulty in patrolling the long Mexican border”). 
 286. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695–96 (2001) (emphasis added) (quoting Kwong 
Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 602 (1953)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 287. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 907 (1975) (Burger, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added). 
 288. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
 289. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 552 (1976) (emphasis added). 
 290. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976) (emphasis added). 
 291. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 480 (1991) (emphasis added). 
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[S]he managed to become the actual parent of a United States citizen by 
conceiving and bearing an illegitimate child here.293
[M]ore significant demographic or economic [problems] . . . are 
engendered by the illegal entry into the State of entire families of aliens 
for indefinite periods than by the periodic sojourns of single 
adults . . . .
 
294
The female alien does not use force to overtake the country.  Rather she 
utilizes her superior reproductive power to attain conquest.
 
295
These fertility metaphors feed into larger debates over jus soli, or 
birthright citizenship, in which opponents frequently express fears about the 
changing racial demographics of the country.
  By 
manipulating American law to achieve power, the female alien is a clever 
invader who relies on legal technicalities to gain advantage. 
296
Whether the attack is by stealth, invasion, or reproduction, the Supreme 
Court’s war metaphors share a common theme:  America is under assault 
by a different kind of enemy.  Through metaphor, Supreme Court Justices 
become protectors of a nation besieged by an ominous alien attack. 
  According to the fertility 
frame, the nation can accept single men who will work temporarily in the 
United States without bringing their culture and traditions with them.  But 
the nation cannot bear the social consequences that come with importing 
entire families who will reside in our communities, study in our schools, 
and worship in our churches.  If the fertile invader is not thwarted soon, her 
massed offspring will overtake the nation.  As such, the fertility metaphor 
presents the loss of cultural hegemony as the most dangerous consequence 
of the alien invasion. 
III.  TOWARD A NEW IMMIGRATION DISCOURSE 
Words affect thought, and thought affects action.  As demonstrated 
above, the Supreme Court’s immigration decisions are filled with evocative 
words that fuse the concept of immigration with notions of criminality, 
devastation, and attack.  Here I consider the consequences of these 
associations and propose an alternative account.  Just as cognitive linguists 
challenged the traditional description of metaphors as minor poetic 
flourishes, I challenge the notion that the Supreme Court’s metaphors are 
nothing more than insignificant textual ornaments. 
 
 292. INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 143 n.5 (1981) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Villena v. INS, 622 F.2d 1352, 1362 (9th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (Wallace, J., dissenting)). 
 293. INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 226 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 294. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 249 n.10 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 295. See O’Brien, supra note 13, at 39 (analyzing immigration rhetoric that focuses on 
different birth rates among immigrants and citizens). 
 296. See Jonathan C. Drimmer, The Nephews of Uncle Sam:  The History, Evolution, and 
Application of Birthright Citizenship in the United States, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 667, 709–13 
(1995) (discussing the racial dynamic of birthright citizenship debates); Gerald L. Neuman, 
Back to Dred Scott?, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 485, 499–500 (1987) (reviewing PETER H. 
SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT (1985)) (arguing that much of 
the debate over jus soli can be traced to issues of race and culture). 
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This section begins by comparing the Supreme Court’s metaphors to the 
metaphors of immigration policy.  Whether Congress is building a virtual 
fence, requiring tamperproof identification cards, or sanctioning the mass 
incarceration of aliens, each step can be understood in terms of the 
metaphors discussed above. 
The conceptual theory of metaphor explains why Congress legislates 
metaphorically in the same way that the Supreme Court rules 
metaphorically.  Because meaning is culturally grounded, the social 
construction of immigrants depends on numerous voices coming from 
multiple cultural institutions such as Congress and the Supreme Court.  No 
one institution is an exclusive or independent source of social meaning.  
Through metaphors, Congress, the Court, and other cultural bodies facilitate 
a discussion among lawyers, commentators, and legislators about “the 
immigration crisis” and the proposed responses to the crisis.297  Thus, the 
Court’s metaphoric choices do far more than reflect popular understandings 
of immigration.  By appropriating, repackaging, and circulating certain 
immigration metaphors, the Court joins other cultural institutions in 
creating a dominant account of who immigrants are and how they should be 
treated.298
The Article concludes by considering opportunities for discursive 
change.  I offer the concepts of migration and economic sanctuary as 
alternative metaphors for understanding immigration.  The idea of 
migration focuses on the movement of people, rather than on an invasion of 
aliens.  Likewise, the idea of economic sanctuary presents immigration as a 
product of trade and structural adjustment policies, rather than as a product 
of simple criminal intent.  These metaphors highlight immigrants’ 
personhood and potential for economic cooperation—characteristics 
concealed by current accounts. 
 
A.  Metaphors of Immigration Reform 
Cognitive linguists speak of “entailments” as additional information that 
listeners logically adopt from metaphors.299  As such, entailments are 
underspecified pieces of knowledge that emerge naturally from conceptual 
metaphors.300
 
 297. LAKOFF & FERGUSON, supra note 
  For example, the metaphor IMMIGRATION IS A FLOOD 
directly maps information about the size and power of floods, while 
indirectly entailing additional information that listeners associate with 
floods.  Thus, we know that communities raise levies against floods and 
that floodwaters carry disease.  When lawmakers understand a problem in 
metaphoric terms, they often formulate policies based on these metaphoric 
entailments.  Therefore, a metaphor’s entailments are as important, if not 
32, at 1–2 (arguing that the “immigrant problem” 
could also be understood as a “foreign policy problem” or a “trade problem”). 
 298. See Briggs, supra note 14, at 272 (explaining how meaning derives from 
“appropriation and reception”). 
 299. See Hunter, supra note 39, at 471–72 (arguing that the conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A 
JOURNEY entails that people may face roadblocks or spin their wheels at times). 
 300. KÖVECSES, supra note 25, at 94–95 (defining metaphoric entailments). 
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more important, than the information utilized directly in the mapping 
process.301
The Supreme Court’s immigration metaphors—alien, flood, and 
invasion—contain several entailments that are reflected in contemporary 
immigration policies.  Consider the recent debate over immigration reform.  
The last serious congressional attempt to alter the nation’s immigration 
laws contained three core proposals:  enhanced border security, an 
expanded guestworker program, and amnesty for the nearly twelve million 
unauthorized immigrants living in the United States.
 
302
Each component of immigration reform can be seen as an entailment of 
the metaphors discussed above.  For example, the alien metaphor is evident 
in proposals to modify the nation’s guestworker system.  A new 
guestworker program would import hundreds of thousands of workers into 
the United States each year.
 
303  Advocates of this proposal promise that 
guestworkers will work in the United States several years and then return 
home.  The description of immigrants as temporary visitors situates the 
nation as a family and aliens as guests of the family.304  “Aliens” are 
defined as people “belonging to another . . . family.”305  When a guest 
arrives at a family’s house, the family controls the conditions of the guest’s 
residency; the guest is told where to sleep and how long to stay.  According 
to the vision fostered by the guestworker proposal, aliens will express 
gratitude to the nation by making food for their hosts, cleaning their homes, 
and washing their dishes.  Because they are aliens (i.e., strangers to the 
national family), the guests cannot stay indefinitely.  Once their temporary 
stay is over, the alien guests will leave politely and make room for other 
guests to begin work in the United States.306
As discussed above, the alien metaphor conceals the humanity of 
immigrants.  The mapping of nonhuman qualities onto immigrants was 
evident in Congress’s attempt to prevent unauthorized immigrants from 
obtaining driver’s licenses in the REAL ID Act of 2005.
  This image of foreign-born 
guests working in the national house becomes possible only when 
immigrants are first understood as alien strangers. 
307
 
 301. Simon, supra note 
  Drawing on the 
85, at 1041 (discussing the importance of entailments). 
 302. See Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, S. 1348, 110th Cong. 
(introduced May 9, 2007); Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th 
Cong. (passed by the Senate on May 25, 2006); JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW 
HISPANIC CTR., A PORTRAIT OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES ii (2009), 
available at http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=107 (estimating that 11.9 
million unauthorized immigrants live in the United States); Michael J. Wishnie, Labor Law 
After Legalization, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1446, 1446–47 (2008) (examining immigration reform 
proposals). 
 303. See Cristina M. Rodríguez, Guest Workers and Integration:  Toward a Theory of 
What Immigrants and Americans Owe One Another, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 219, 219–20 
(2007) (analyzing recent guestworker proposals). 
 304. See KÖVECSES, supra note 25, at 62 (discussing the metaphor SOCIETY IS A FAMILY). 
 305. 1 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 314–15 (2d ed. 1989). 
 306. See Rodríguez, supra note 305, at 220–22 (discussing the difficulties associated with 
a large-scale guestworker program). 
 307. Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 302 (2005) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30301 
(2006)). 
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alien metaphor, the REAL ID Act labeled people who belong in the United 
States as “real,” while describing unauthorized immigrants as unreal or 
inauthentic people.  Unreal people are not entitled to basic credentials 
needed to live and work in society; they do not open bank accounts or rent 
apartments.308
The amnesty component of immigration reform is an entailment of the 
invasion metaphor.  “Amnesty” is defined as “the overlooking of the past 
offences of (rebels).”
  Unreal people live nowhere because they are make-believe.  
By rejecting the personhood of immigrants, the alien metaphor facilitates 
this outcome. 
309
The invasion metaphor entails the need for weapons, fronts, and battle 
lines.  In the last decade, Congress has allocated billions of dollars to 
militarize the border.
  Because the invasion metaphor describes 
immigration as an especially dangerous threat, however, citizens are 
reluctant to overlook the past offenses of aliens through amnesty.  If 
immigrants are enemy soldiers, as the invasion metaphor suggests, then the 
country should capture and defeat them rather than forgive their war crimes.  
Although the law of war allows governments to grant amnesty, public 
attitudes have become so shaped by the image of battle against aliens that 
such acts of forgiveness appear treasonous. 
310  Touting the need for greater “border security,” the 
government has installed electronic intrusion sensors and a virtual fence 
along sections of the border, while providing agents with night-vision 
equipment to see the enemy at all hours.311  Enacting battle plans with 
names such as “Operation Hold the Line” and “Operation Blockade,” 
immigration officials have coordinated with the U.S. military to deploy 
soldiers along the border.312
The flood metaphor also informs contemporary immigration policy.  
Immigration reform proposals focus on the need to create a “more 
manageable and controlled flow of legal immigrants who can be absorbed 
  Reflecting metaphor’s power to conflate, the 
border is now an actual militarized zone with real soldiers and real 
casualties. 
 
 308. See Raquel Aldana, On Rights, Federal Citizenship, and the “Alien”, 46 WASHBURN 
L.J. 268–69 (2007) (discussing recent anti-immigrant legislation). 
 309. 1 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 941 (2d ed. 1989) (emphasis added). 
 310. See NGAI, supra note 231, at 266 (describing the “stunning militarization” of the 
border that occurred in the 1990s); Anne Demo, Sovereignty Discourse and Contemporary 
Immigration Politics, 91 Q.J. SPEECH 291, 302 (2005) (explaining how the U.S. military has 
constructed elaborate barriers along the border). 
 311. Demo, supra note 310, at 302 (emphasis added); see also Kate Philips, The War of 
Words, NIEMAN REP., Fall 2006, at 63, available at 
http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/article/100346/The-War-of-Words.aspx 
(summarizing political efforts to employ the terms “illegal alien” and “border security” to 
frame immigration-related issues). 
 312. See Demo, supra note 310, at 296–97 (summarizing the expansion of defense-related 
funding to patrol the border) (emphasis added); see also J. David Cisneros, Contaminated 
Communities:  The Metaphor of “Immigrant as Pollutant” in Media Representations of 
Immigration, 11 RHETORIC & PUB. AFF. 569, 593 (2008) (discussing the relationship between 
border fencing and the image of immigrants as invaders). 
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by our economy.”313  These reforms are set against a backdrop of failure in 
immigration enforcement.  As discussed above, the flood metaphor 
describes the overwhelming force of immigration.  An entailment of the 
metaphor, therefore, is that attempts to secure the border are futile given the 
strength of the immigrant wave.  Through decades of purposeful 
underenforcement of immigration laws, millions of unauthorized 
immigrants have entered the United States without permission.314  Much 
like local emergency workers who sandbag levies, knowing all the while 
that rising floodwaters will overtake their community, politicians discuss 
the need to control the alien stream, but enact ineffective enforcement 
techniques to achieve that end.315  Understandably, Americans share a 
widespread belief that the government is not doing enough to seal the 
border.316
B.  Legal Metaphors and Social Discourse 
 
The conceptual theory of metaphor explains the common immigration 
discourses of legal opinions and legislation.  Because reasoning is grounded 
in our embodied experiences, the social understanding of immigrants 
derives from multiple sources.  Human beings absorb metaphors 
unconsciously through repeated interactions with their physical worlds and 
cultural environments.  It is the recurrence of these experiences in a wide 
array of social and cultural settings that establishes the basis of human 
reasoning.317
Supreme Court Justices are among the most prominent members of the 
American linguistic community.  They are “symbolic elites” who wield 
extra-legal power by recreating immigration narratives and presenting them 
to the social world.
  Thus, cognition is not a simple process in which either the 
media, or politicians, or Supreme Court Justices construct the image of 
immigrants out of whole cloth.  Rather, the “truth” about immigration 
emerges from a confluence of discourses produced and repeated by many 
cultural institutions. 
318
 
 313. Press Release, Schumer Announces Principles for Comprehensive Immigration 
Reform Bill in Works in Senate (June 24, 2009) (emphasis added), available at 
http://schumer.senate.gov /new_website/record.cfm?id=314990. 
  Justices express themselves predominately through 
 314. See Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration 
Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 813–14 (2007) (describing the nation’s “illegal immigration 
system”); see also MOTOMURA, supra note 196, at 129–35 (arguing that government officials 
largely tolerate unlawful immigration). 
 315. See Hiroshi Motomura, Comment, Choosing Immigrants, Making Citizens, 59 STAN. 
L. REV. 857, 867 (2007) (examining the underenforcement of immigration laws). 
 316. See Jeesun Kim, More than a Political Hot Potato:  News Framing of the U.S. 
Immigration Debate in Election Years 3, presented at the International Communication 
Association Annual Conference, San Francisco, Cal. (May 25, 2007) (showing that eighty-
two percent of Americans believe that the government has failed to control illegal entry into 
the United States). 
 317. See Berger, supra note 20, at 176–77 (describing metaphor as a form of “imaginative 
rationality”). 
 318. See Majid Khosravinik, The Representation of Refugees, Asylum Seekers and 
Immigrants in British Newspapers During the Balkan Conflict (1999) and the British 
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written opinions,319 and metaphors often provide the most quotable 
passages of those opinions.320  By enhancing the apparent persuasive force 
of a particular decision, the Supreme Court’s immigration metaphors 
increase the likelihood that lower courts will rely upon and cite to them.321
But the Supreme Court’s discursive influence extends well beyond the 
legal community.  By authoritatively expressing beliefs shared in law and 
society, Supreme Court Justices engage citizens, government officials, and 
other non-legal actors through their written opinions.
 
322  News outlets 
publicize Supreme Court decisions within minutes of their release.  
Reporters, many of whom have no formal legal training, rarely have time to 
read and digest opinions before informing the public of a particular judicial 
outcome.323  Accordingly, members of the media are more likely to quote 
vivid metaphoric language that reconfirms existing conceptions about 
immigrants.  In this way, media reports serve as discrete linguistic acts that 
interact with legal texts to provide a prevailing narrative on immigration.324
Robert Tsai has argued that the Court’s First Amendment metaphors 
exude a “disturbing ethos of judicial centrality” that influences the behavior 
of non-legal actors.
 
325  For example, members of the Court have employed 
fire metaphors in their free expression rulings to cast themselves as would-
be firefighters against state attempts to restrict specific speech acts.  
According to Tsai, the juricentric posture of the fire metaphor discourages 
inter-community dialogue and political engagement by standing as the 
definitive account on certain First Amendment matters.326
The Supreme Court’s immigration metaphors are models for 
understanding the world that masquerade as models of the world.
  The same is true 
with metaphoric depictions of immigrants in the law.  The Court’s 
metaphors absorb and repackage cultural assumptions about immigration, 
adding an air of authority, neutrality, and exclusivity to representations that 
non-legal actors are invited to accept uncritically. 
327
 
General Election (2005), 20 DISCOURSE & SOC. 477, 479 (2009) (discussing the relationship 
between language and ideology). 
  In 
order to make this transition believable to readers who interpret texts based 
 319. See Maureen Archer & Ronnie Cohen, Sidelines on the (Judicial) Bench:  Sports 
Metaphors in Judicial Opinions, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 225, 227 (1998) (describing written 
opinions as “the most important expression of judicial authority”). 
 320. See generally BOSMAJIAN, supra note 19, at 13–15 (discussing how courts circulate 
and repeat certain metaphors). 
 321. See Chad M. Oldfather, The Hidden Ball:  A Substantive Critique of Baseball 
Metaphors in Judicial Opinions, 27 CONN. L. REV. 17, 20–21 (1994) (explaining how 
metaphors provide legal opinions with substantive force). 
 322. See Tsai, supra note 18, at 192 (arguing that courts are “intent upon engaging the 
American populace”). 
 323. See Archer & Cohen, supra note 319, at 227–28 (discussing the cultural significance 
of Supreme Court opinions). 
 324. Khosravinik, supra note 318, at 479 (explaining how different public discourses are 
formed). 
 325. Tsai, supra note 18, at 185, 236–39 (criticizing the notion that “the legal system 
functions as the hub around which other American institutions orbit”). 
 326. Id. at 238–39. 
 327. NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 103–04 (1978). 
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on their own social experiences, the Court employs metaphors that conform 
to existing cultural knowledge about the scope and nature of the perceived 
problem.328  This becomes an entirely circular process in which the Court’s 
metaphors join discourses from other cultural institutions to sustain and 
reconstitute a “regime of truth” about immigration.329  In this way, 
metaphors become self-fulfilling prophecies by highlighting certain 
realities, masking others, and entailing a narrow universe of responses for 
readers to consider.330
Metaphors of criminality, flood, and invasion leave little space for 
readers to understand immigration-related issues outside frames selected for 
them by the Court and other cultural institutions.
 
331  Because the mind 
develops metaphoric associations unconsciously over a prolonged period of 
time, readers are unaware that, absent concerted efforts to critically analyze 
Supreme Court texts, images from the past will be recycled as frames for 
understanding immigration in the future.332  As such, without methods for 
challenging existing representations, readers will continue to serve as 
unknowing accomplices to immigration metaphors and the legal realities 
they entail.333
C.  Motivating Analogic Reasoning Through Similes 
 
Metaphor is not an exclusive vehicle for figurative representation.  Like 
metaphors, similes enable speakers to imagine new concepts in terms of 
embodied physical and cultural knowledge.  But similes do not conflate 
domains in the same manner as metaphors.  Instead, similes enable speakers 
to recognize and evaluate proposed correspondences with a level of 
transparency that metaphors fail to offer. 
Similes create explicit associations between target and source domains by 
using the words “like” or “as” in their phrasing.334
 
 328. Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and 
Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2270 (1989) (describing judges as people who 
“retail” legal rules by drawing from cultural experiences created at the “wholesale” level). 
  Consider the following 
simile:  “Illegal immigration is like a military invasion.”  The statement 
invites listeners to notice and assess the contention that illegal entry into the 
United States is much like a foreign attack.  If readers disagree about the 
appropriateness of the comparison, they can articulate their objections and 
propose alternative accounts. 
 329. See Hector Amaya, Latino Immigrants in the American Discourses of Citizenship 
and Nationalism During the Iraqi War, 4 CRITICAL DISCOURSE STUD. 237, 238 (2007) (citing 
Michel Foucault, Truth and Power, in THE FOUCAULT READER 51, 74 (Paul Rabinow ed., 
1984)). 
 330. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 156–58 (examining the limitations of 
metaphoric entailments). 
 331. ONO & SLOOP, supra note 236, at 123. 
 332. See Blavin & Cohen, supra note 95, at 267 (warning against the unconscious 
acceptance of metaphors). 
 333. Boudin, supra note 35, at 413–14 (explaining how metaphors facilitate interactions 
between writers and readers). 
 334. See Shaul E. Cohen & David A. Frank, Jerusalem and the Riparian Simile, 21 POL. 
GEOGRAPHY 745, 750 (2002) (examining the descriptive attributes of similes). 
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In contrast to similes, metaphors such as “the silent invasion of illegal 
aliens” or “border security” morph the figurative into the literal, thereby 
concealing the analogic nature of each statement.  The metaphor subsumes 
differences between the two domains, producing a dangerous literalism that 
readers may fail to recognize.335
Given the central role of analogic reasoning in law, the shift from 
metaphor to simile involves more than a simple alteration of verbiage.
  Through metaphor, the immigrant 
becomes the alien; illegal immigration becomes an invasion. 
336  
Lawyers are professional deductionists and analogists.  They are trained to 
deduce a legal rule from a statute or holding of a case;337 they then argue 
whether the particular legal norm does or does not govern a given set of 
facts based on the similarities or dissimilarities between the norm and the 
facts.338  As discussed above, the personal metaphors of immigration law 
rarely facilitate this kind of analysis.339
Although lawyers are hard-wired to reason analogically, metaphors short-
circuit the process.  In contrast, similes facilitate new modes for 
understanding problems by directly engaging lawyers’ analogic senses.  For 
example, in the context of immigration discourse, similes allow legal actors 
to assess whether immigration is like a flood, or whether unauthorized 
immigrants are like violent criminals.
  Rather than attempt to capture a 
specific legal concept through analogic reasoning, immigration metaphors 
attempt to capture the “essence” of noncitizens by conflating different 
domains. 
340
D.  Migration and Economic Sanctuary as Outlaw Metaphors 
  If readers determine that aspects 
of the source and target domains are divergent or contradictory, they will 
reject the simile in favor of other frames that comport with their physical 
and cultural understandings of the world.  Thus, similes not only allow for 
the rational evaluation of current figurative expressions, they make room 
for new immigration frames as readers reject other models.  As such, 
similes ask members of the linguistic community to recognize and contest 
certain representations of immigrants that, if stated in metaphoric terms, 
would pass silently into the legal imagination without discussion. 
Even if similes attain a more prominent place in legal discourse, 
metaphors will remain a fundamental component of language and 
 
 335. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing, supra note 79, at 1386–87 (explaining how 
metaphoric statements can transform into myths). 
 336. See Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 748 (1993) 
(discussing the centrality of analogy in law). 
 337. Hunter, supra note 57, at 1238–42 (discussing assumptions about the processes of 
legal deduction and analogy). 
 338. See Boudin, supra note 35, at 406 n.73 (arguing that lawyers use analogy “to invoke 
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 339. See supra Part I.C and accompanying text (discussing the dangers of conflation 
posed by immigration metaphors). 
 340. Cohen & Frank, supra note 334, at 761 (arguing that similes can restructure conflict 
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thought.341  The human mind cannot always rationally assess multiple and 
overlapping correspondences.  In order to simplify decisions, we depend on 
the cognitive shortcuts provided by metaphors.342
The Supreme Court’s immigration metaphors are not immutable.  
Because metaphors are socially contingent, the Court’s metaphoric choices 
will change as social understandings of immigrants change.  At first glance, 
then, the goal of altering existing representations appears exceedingly 
difficult; after all, major cultural shifts take time.  But the introduction of 
competing metaphors does not require such a radical change.  Linguistic 
metaphors are not merely products of embodied knowledge but also 
methods for re-creating culture.  Like political discourse, the law is situated 
and contingent.
  Therefore, in order to 
challenge the popular metaphoric representations of immigrants in the law, 
critics cannot simply ignore existing representations, but rather must offer a 
new set of words, images, and modes of figurative thought to compete with 
current frames. 
343
Because today’s immigration metaphors represent only a partial selection 
of reality, competing representations should draw from aspects of existing 
cultural knowledge that current metaphors fail to utilize.  For example, the 
Supreme Court’s immigration metaphors rely on embodied understandings 
of crime and invasion, but ignore issues related to movement and economic 
survival—concepts deeply embedded in our historical and cultural 
knowledge.  Thus, the task of introducing new legal metaphors is not so 
much about modifying culture as it is accessing cultural references that 
members of the linguistic community already possess. 
  When legal actors present new methods for talking 
about a problem, they create opportunities for altering social discourse and 
the social understanding of the problem as well. 
Before competing representations can emerge, however, legal actors must 
unwrap and evaluate current frames.  Because metaphors loosen their hold 
on the human imagination only through negotiation and debate, much of the 
foregoing analysis has been directed toward that end.344  The limitation of 
this approach, however, is that it largely retells someone else’s story.345
 
 341. See Michael J. Yelnosky, If You Write It, (S)he Will Come:  Judicial Opinions, 
Metaphors, Baseball, and “The Sex Stuff,” 28 CONN. L. REV. 813, 817–18 (1996) (describing 
metaphors as unavoidable aspects of discourse). 
  
The critical discussion must extend beyond the problems associated with 
existing metaphors so that legal actors might imagine new metaphoric 
possibilities. 
 342. See Charteris-Black, supra note 271, at 565–72 (examining the role metaphor plays 
as a cognitive heuristic); Duncan, supra note 90, at 799–800 (explaining how human 
communication depends on metaphors). 
 343. See David T. Ritchie, The Centrality of Metaphor in Legal Analysis and 
Communication:  An Introduction, 58 MERCER L. REV. 839, 841–42 (2007) (arguing that 
discourses can change as speakers employ new metaphors). 
 344. See Otto Santa Ana, ‘Like an Animal I Was Treated’:  Anti-Immigrant Metaphor in 
U.S. Public Discourse, 10 DISCOURSE & SOC. 191, 203 (1999) (examining entrenched 
metaphors). 
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According to cognitive linguists, the human mind is more likely to adopt 
metaphors stated in positive terms.346  Metaphors “work” when they offer 
affirmative correspondences between source and target domains.  Thus, it is 
insufficient to explain why immigrants are not criminals or why 
immigration is not like an overwhelming flood.  Likewise, terms such as 
“undocumented worker” and “noncitizen” present rather uncompelling 
accounts because they describe immigrants in the negative.347  In contrast, 
new metaphors must explain affirmatively what immigration is and who 
immigrants are based on a shared body of cultural knowledge.348
Here I examine the ideas of migration and economic sanctuary
 
349 as 
“outlaw” metaphors.350  By “outlaw,” I mean a category of concepts that tie 
into existing embodied knowledge but have not gained currency in popular 
discourse.  Outlaw discourses appear strange because they do not comport 
with dominant accounts created by conventional metaphors.  As they are 
circulated and tested against experiential knowledge, however, these 
metaphors may eventually shift from outlaw to dominant components of a 
new immigration vernacular.351
The concept of migration focuses on the personhood of unauthorized 
immigrants.  Under the taxonomy proposed here, noncitizens residing 
lawfully in the United States are referred to as “immigrants,” while those 
without authorization are called “migrants.”  A migrant is “a person who 
moves temporarily . . . from place to place.”
 
352
Migration involves a temporary movement between places that results in 
permanent residence in sending and receiving countries.  Migrants travel 
between places, but their travel will not last forever; they will someday 
settle within a nation-state.  An entailment of migration, therefore, is that 
  Unlike illegal aliens who 
commit crimes in the shadows, migrants are people who move, work, and 
live openly in and between societies. 
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both sending and receiving countries must adopt frameworks for 
encouraging belonging among all residents—an outcome that is especially 
needed in a transnational era.353
Upon arrival in the United States, migrants inevitably formulate ties to 
employers, social networks, and cultural institutions.  Migrants who travel 
to a specific nation with only a temporary intent to stay often become legal 
permanent residents as their community connections expand.
 
354  But even 
migrants who never obtain legal status should be treated as presumptive 
members of receiving countries.  Nations maintain a vested interest in 
fostering social belonging among all residents.  Both citizens and 
noncitizens benefit from modes of social discourse that offer migrants a 
long-term stake in the welfare of their communities.355
The idea of economic sanctuary brings focus to the reasons people 
migrate between nations.
  As such, the 
migration metaphor recognizes the inevitability of migrants in a 
transnational age and the need to encourage cooperation between 
community members, regardless of the outcome of any one person’s 
migrant journey. 
356  By “economic sanctuary,” I employ a 
decidedly non-legal definition, as immigration law does not provide relief 
for economic persecution alone.357
To grant “sanctuary” means “to place in safety” or “to afford protection 
or shelter.”
  In addition, unlike the migrant 
metaphor (a linguistic term that could conceivably displace “illegal alien” in 
the legal vernacular), I examine the economic sanctuary metaphor for its 
conceptual benefits only.  In other words, migration is a method for talking 
about immigration, whereas economic sanctuary is a method for thinking 
about immigration. 
358
 
 353. See generally MOTOMURA, supra note 
  As such, economic sanctuary describes migrants as people 
seeking shelter in the United States in order to endure economically.  Most 
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work.359  Yet current immigration metaphors conceal migrants’ economic 
entrepreneurship, instead presenting immigrants as criminals and invaders.  
In contrast, the economic sanctuary metaphor brings focus to the forced 
displacement of people, thereby inviting readers to evaluate the complex 
causes of illegal immigration.360  For example, recent trade and structural 
adjustment policies have hampered employment opportunities in many 
developing countries.361  When small businesses cannot compete with 
transnational corporations in the production of goods and services, local 
farms and factories must close and lay off workers.  Migrants are born from 
these circumstances.362
Metaphors are effective only to the extent that they rely on shared 
cultural frames.
  Seen in this light, migrants are neither criminals 
nor invaders, but instead people who cross international borders in order to 
survive.  As such, the economic sanctuary metaphor brings focus to the 
human consequence of globalization. 
363  Thus, listeners will accept migration and economic 
sanctuary as metaphors only if the concepts comport with their physical, 
social, and cultural experiences.  American historical narratives shed an 
exceedingly positive light on the concept of migration.  Since colonial 
times, Americans have sought to improve their economic status through 
relocation.364  Tied to notions of “frontier” and “exploration,” migration 
draws on popular historical accounts of national progress.365  Likewise, 
neoclassical economic theory posits that societies flourish when markets 
allow human capital to flow freely.366
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economically when all workers can travel between jobs.  Seen through these 
frames, migration is an economically effective process that governments 
should encourage. 
In addition to the foregoing social, economic, and historical accounts, the 
migration metaphor relates to readers’ personal life experiences as well.  
People often associate economic growth with physical movement.  We 
move to attend schools.  We travel to new cities in search of employment.  
We understand that personal advances in education, wealth, and security 
often require physical movement.  Drawing on these associations, the 
concept of migration depicts immigrants as economically motivated people 
whose movement enhances social welfare. 
The economic sanctuary metaphor also references shared experiences.  
Popular accounts of globalization present displaced American workers as 
victims of outsourcing.  Society remains largely sympathetic to Americans 
who have lost their jobs through no fault of their own.  Accordingly, state 
and federal legislatures extend unemployment benefits and job training to 
these workers.  Building on this embodied knowledge, the economic 
sanctuary metaphor emphasizes the connections shared by migrants and 
displaced American workers; just as Americans become unemployed when 
their jobs are shipped overseas, migrants feel the consequences of 
international trade from the other side of the border.  In this way, the 
economic sanctuary metaphor taps into cultural beliefs about the need to 
assist innocent, hard-working people who are harmed by international 
forces beyond their control. 
The terms proposed here offer admittedly imperfect representations.  
Because the process of mapping qualities from source to target domains is 
always partial, no single metaphor can fully capture any one concept.367  
For example, not every instance of migration is motivated by poverty or a 
lack of opportunity, as the economic sanctuary metaphor suggests; some 
people migrate in order to flee political persecution, while others move to 
live with family members.  Even for those people who migrate out of 
economic necessity, nations may still choose to deny them sanctuary.  In 
this way, the economic sanctuary metaphor is not a prescription for 
immigration policy but rather a conceptual vehicle for thinking about 
immigration in a global context.  The metaphor does not foreclose realistic 
immigration restrictions but encourages policymakers to develop those 
restrictions based on representations that reflect the diverse and nuanced 
causes of international migration.368
 
 367. See Stephanie A. Gore, “A Rose by Any Other Name”:  Judicial Use of Metaphors 
for New Technologies, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 403, 425 (2003) (noting that even 
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Because metaphors involve individualized, unconscious associations, 
these proposals may cause readers to ascribe characteristics to target groups 
that are neither intended nor desired.  For example, although the concept of 
migration highlights immigrants’ entrepreneurship and economic 
contributions, it may also encourage an image of migrants as rootless 
wanderers.  These associations cannot be avoided.  As stated above, 
migration involves a temporary movement that results in permanent 
residence.  Therefore, the metaphor encourages thought about how to treat 
members of this “wandering” class, given that a person’s transient presence 
often morphs into permanent residence.  But even if readers overlook the 
temporary nature of migration and view migrants as a perpetual class, the 
term still stimulates debate about the global factors causing international 
migration and the need to enhance the affiliations that members of this 
perceived transient class have with existing social, civic, and cultural 
institutions. 
Abstract concepts such as immigration entail different, sometimes 
contradictory, realities.  Therefore, multiple metaphoric expressions are 
needed in order to establish meaning.369  The goal of this project, then, is 
not to offer terms that comprehensively describe immigration, but rather to 
expand the cluster of metaphors used to talk and think about 
immigration.370
The potential awkwardness of the migration and economic sanctuary 
metaphors speaks to the ubiquity of existing representations.  Outlaw 
discourses may seem strange or unrealistic to readers.
 
371
CONCLUSION 
  But the economic 
sanctuary metaphor appears peculiar only because other metaphors such as 
invasion and flood appear normal.  Likewise, the migration metaphor feels 
artificial only when terms such as illegal alien and undocumented worker 
appear to delineate the bounds of our discursive realities.  Thus, in addition 
to highlighting new aspects of immigration-related issues, the terms 
proposed here serve as effective tools for deconstructing popular 
representations.  This critical process diminishes the power of existing 
metaphors to conflate and essentialize, while creating space for new frames 
in the legal imagination. 
Human beings tell stories in order to comprehend the world around them.  
As the nation’s preeminent legal storyteller, the Supreme Court has 
employed a host of metaphors to tell its immigration stories.  Complete with 
heroes, villains, and foreboding plotlines, these stories describe aliens 
attacking, invaders encroaching, and floods overwhelming communities.  
Behaving like good audience members, most judges, lawyers, and scholars 
have passively accepted this narrative. 
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If they were not obscured by metaphors, the images of immigrants in 
Supreme Court texts would appear comical, if not utterly tragic.  For 
example, immigrants are not animals that succumb to “lure[s]” or are 
hunted by “roving patrols.”372  Capturing migrants is not equivalent to 
cleaning up a “leaking hazardous waste dump,” even if the Supreme Court 
describes immigration in those terms.373
Because conceptual metaphors live in the imagination, attempts at 
revision must draw on the imaginative possibilities of language.  If we can 
imagine immigration as an invasion, then we can also imagine it as a 
method for improving economic stability and national welfare.  If, through 
metaphor, immigrants can be viewed as aliens and illegals, then they can 
also be viewed as migrants, workers, and community members.  By 
critically evaluating metaphor—the cornerstone of immigration stories—we 
can approach legal opinions with a sense of agency, thereby rejecting the 
inevitability of current frames.  From there, we might imagine a new 
immigration discourse for future legal texts—one that emphasizes 
cooperation over struggle, contribution over battle, and personhood over 
alienage. 
  Yet metaphor’s power to distort 
and pass without notice enables these and other dehumanizing 
representations to evade evaluation.   
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